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We propose trace abstraction modulo probability, a proof technique for verifying high-probability accuracy
guarantees of probabilistic programs. Our proofs overapproximate the set of program traces using failure
automata, nite-state automata that upper bound the probability of failing to satisfy a target specication.
We automate proof construction by reducing probabilistic reasoning to logical reasoning: we use program
synthesis methods to select axioms for sampling instructions, and then apply Craig interpolation to prove that
traces fail the target specication with only a small probability. Our method handles programs with unknown
inputs, parameterized distributions, innite state spaces, and parameterized specications. We evaluate our
technique on a range of randomized algorithms drawn from the dierential privacy literature and beyond. To
our knowledge, our approach is the rst to automatically establish accuracy properties of these algorithms.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the recent explosion of interest in data analysis, randomized algorithms are increasingly
seeing applications across all of computer science. ese algorithms satisfy a wide variety of subtle
probabilistic properties: modeling statistical privacy of database queries (Dwork and Roth 2014),
stability and generalization of machine learning procedures (Bousquet and Elissee 2002), fairness
of decision-making algorithms (Dwork et al. 2012), and more.
Many probabilistic properties are tailored to specic applications, but perhaps the most fun-
damental properties are accuracy gurantees, the probabilistic analogue of functional correctness.
While such specications would ideally hold all of the time—with probability 1—such stringent
guarantees rule out many useful applications of of randomization. Accuracy properties are oen
phrased as high-probability guarantees: for all program inputs, an output sampled from the nal
distribution satises φ except with some probability β . For instance, a noisy numeric output
rnoisy might satisfy a precision bound φ , |rnoisy − rexact | < 5.2 except with probability at most
β , 0.01, where rexact is the answer without noise. While the failure probability β can be a concrete
value in [0, 1], it is oen treated symbolically so that the guarantee φ may depend on β—e.g.,
φ(β) , |rnoisy − rexact | < 1/β gives higher condence guarantees by widening the error range. is
kind of property describes how well an algorithm will perform at varying levels of condence,
crucial information for the algorithm designer. Our goal is to enable algorithm designers to prove
accuracy specications fully automatically.
While simple to state, accuracy guarantees—like other probabilistic properties—pose interesting
challenges for automated verication. Current techniques have focused on more tractable models of
randomized computation, especially probabilistic automata and Markov Decision Processes. (Recent
surveys by Baier et al. (2018) and Katoen (2016) provide a good overview.) By treating parameters
and inputs as known constants, tools can apply numerical methods to compute event probabilities
in the output distribution. ere are now several mature verication tools (e.g., (Dehnert et al. 2017;
Kwiatkowska et al. 2011)), which have found notable success in helping designers automatically
analyze complex probabilistic systems rigorously. However, their common foundation leads to
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common weaknesses: they are mostly restricted to closed programs with xed inputs and nite
state spaces, and support for properties with symbolic parameters remains limited.
In this paper, we start from established automated verication techniques for non-probabilistic
programs and extend them to the probabilistic seing. Our logic-based approach yields several
benets. By reasoning symbolically instead of numerically, we can (i) directly establish properties
for all inputs rather than requiring xed inputs, (ii) handle programs that sample from distributions
with unknown parameters, possibly over innite ranges, and (iii) prove parametric accuracy
properties, making it possible to automatically establish tradeos between accuracy and failure
probabilities, and capture the dependence on other input parameters.
1.1 An Overview of Our Approach
Trace Abstraction Modulo Probability. Our approach is based on trace abstraction (Farzan et al.
2013; Heizmann et al. 2009, 2010, 2013), a proof technique for non-probabilistic verication. A
program P is represented by a language L(P) of syntactic execution traces through the control-ow
graph. To prove that P satises φ, we rst overapproximate L(P) with nite-state automata:
L(P) ⊆ L(A1) ∪ · · · ∪ L(An)
To show that all traces in ∪iL(Ai ) satisfy φ, the automata are annotated with Hoare-style assertions
overapproximating reachable states along execution traces—annotations are usually computed via
predicate abstraction (Graf and Saı¨di 1997) or Craig interpolation (McMillan 2006). Intuitively, trace
abstraction constructs proofs for subsets of traces; the combined proofs verify the whole program.
To extend this idea to probabilistic programs, suppose we want to prove that φ holds except with
probabiltity at most β . We construct a set of automata that (i) overapproximates all traces in L(P)
and (ii) satises the following probabilistic bound:∑
τ ∈∪i L(Ai )
Pr[φ not true aer running τ ] 6 β
In words, the total failure probability—across all traces represented by the automata—is at most β .
While trace inclusion is relatively simple to check, verifying the probabilistic bound over innitely
many traces is more challenging. To ease the task, our automata are annotated with Hoare-style
assertions describing reachable program states, and also failure probabilities, upper bounds on the
probability of not reaching those program states.
Automating Proofs. To construct trace abstractions automatically, our approach proves that
individual program traces τ satisfy φ with a failure probability β , and then generalizes the proof
into a (potentially innite) set of traces represented by an automaton Aτ such that the sum of
failure probabilities of traces in Aτ is at most β . We repeatedly pick, prove, and generalize program
traces until we have overapproximated the set of all possible traces L(P).
e most technically intricate piece of our algorithm is the proving step. Given a trace τ , we
want to automatically prove that it satises φ with failure probability β . In the non-probabilistic
seing, trace semantics can be encoded as a logical formula and verication conditions can be
discharged with an smt solver. In our seing, however, traces have probabilistic semantics and
a naı¨ve encoding would be prohibitively complex. Instead, we reduce probabilistic reasoning to
logical reasoning. Specically, we encode the verication condition as a constraint-based synthesis
problem of the form ∃f . ∀X .φ, where the function f chooses between dierent axiomatizations
of probability distributions that are sampled along the given trace. is choice aects the failure
probability of the entire computation, and also determines what we can assume about the result of
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the random sampling statements later on in the trace. e axioms can be seen as approximating
the semantics of probabilistic samplings using a rst-order theory amenable for checking by smt.
Aer proving correctness of a trace τ by solving the formula ∃f . ∀X .φ for f , we demonstrate
how to use Craig interpolation—a well-studied proof technique in traditional, non-probabilistic
verication—to construct a Hoare-style proof of the trace along with failure probabilities. is
proof can then be generalized to cover a potentially innite set of program traces.
Implementation & Case Studies. We have implemented our algorithm and applied it to a range
of sophisticated randomized algorithms, mainly from the dierential privacy literature (Dwork et al.
2006). In dierential privacy, algorithm designers must add noise to protect personal information,
but try to guarantee good accuracy for their data analyses. Our technique automatically proves
intricate accuracy specications capturing this tradeo. To demonstrate our approach’s generality,
we apply our technique to reason about reliability of programs running on approximate hardware
with probabilistic failures.
Design Principle: Reduce Probabilistic Reasoning. Conceptually, our approach divides as-
sertions about state distributions into two pieces: a standard, non-probabilistic predicate φ on
states, and a single number β bounding the probability that φ fails to hold. As a result, much
of the reasoning deals with logical state predicates instead of probabilistic assertions; the failure
probability can be cleanly tracked o to the side. is idea is inspired by the recent probabilistic
Hoare logic ahl (Barthe et al. 2016b).
Reducing probabilistic reasoning to non-probabilistic reasoning is a useful methodology to tame
the complexity of deductive verication (Barthe et al. 2014, 2016b, 2013; Hsu 2017). Avoiding
probabilistic assertions means that our technique cannot take advantage of more precise analyses,
such as concentration bounds based on independence of random variables, but it enables the
application of classical verication techniques—trace abstraction, synthesis, and interpolation—
yielding a high degree of automation. We view this as well worth the cost. Furthermore, our proof
technique compares favorably to standard trace abstraction (Heizmann et al. 2009, 2013) and ahl
(Barthe et al. 2016b) as discuss in § 5.2.
1.2 Outline and Contributions
Aer demonstrating our verication strategy on two worked examples (§ 2) and introducing the
program model (§ 3), we oer the following technical contributions.
• Trace abstraction modulo probability (§ 4): We present a proof rule for probabilistic
accuracy properties, extending trace abstraction to the probabilistic seing. Our proof tech-
nique is based on the new notion of failure automata, labeled automata overapproximating
program traces and their probability of failing to satisfy a given postcondition.
• Automating trace-based proofs (§ 5): We present an algorithm for constructing trace-
based proofs by iteratively building failure automata, proving correctness of nite program
traces, and then generalizing the automata to cover potentially innite sets of traces.
• Proofs & interpolation for probabilistic traces (§ 6): We show that we can prove
correctness of individual probabilistic program traces via a reduction to a constraint-based
synthesis problem, making probabilistic reasoning unnecessary. en, we demonstrate how
to apply Craig interpolation to construct failure automata.
• Implementation & case studies (§ 7): We implement our approach and use it to auto-
matically prove accuracy guarantees of a range of randomized algorithms from the theory
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pick trace
prove trace
trace t
{jpre} P {jpost}
failure
probability b
t 2 L(P) \ L(A)
generalize trace
add At to A
t 2 L(At)
`b {jpre} t {jpost}
proof of trace t
`b {jpre} At {jpost}
Fig. 1. Main loop of verification algorithm
of dierential privacy. We also study an example from the approximate computing litera-
ture. Our implementation establishes accuracy properties with symbolic parameters for
programs with parametric inputs and innite states, a rst for automated verication.
Finally, we survey related work (§ 8) and conclude (§ 9).
2 OVERVIEW AND ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we provide an overview of our proof technique on two simple examples.
2.1 High-Level Overview
Suppose we are given a probabilistic program P , pre- and post-conditions φpre and φpost, and a
numeric expression β representing the maximum allowed failure probability. Our goal is to prove
that if we start executing P from any state satisfying φpre, the probability that the output state does
not satisfy φpost upon termination is at most β . is property is denoted by the following formula,
reminiscent of a Hoare triple:
`β {φpre} P {φpost}
Proof Rule. We view P as a control-ow automaton whose language L(P) is the set of all traces
from the program’s entry location to its exit location. Our proof rule overapproximates L(P) by a
larger set of traces, represented by a set of nite automata A, while ensuring that the total failure
probability across all traces in L(A) is at most β .
Automation. To apply our proof rule automatically, we apply an algorithmic technique summa-
rized in Fig. 1. e technique repeatedly tries to (i) pick a program trace τ ∈ L(P) outside the
approximation L(A), (ii) prove that `β {φpre} τ {φpost}, i.e., the probability that the trace falsies
the Hoare triple is at most β , and then (iii) generalize the trace τ into an automaton Aτ encoding a
set of traces with total failure probability at most β . Our approach succeeds if it constructs a set of
automata A modeling all program traces L(P), with total failure probability at most β .
2.2 Illustrative Example: Loop-free Program
To warm up, we consider the loop-free program in Fig. 2. e function ex1 takes a single [0,1]-valued
input p and returns a Boolean value y. Our goal is to prove the following accuracy property:
`p {true} ex1(p) {¬y}
In words, the program fails to return y = false with probability at most p. is property can be
established informally: (i) the probability that the program takes the then branch and returns
y = true is 0.5p; (ii) the probability that it takes the else branch and returns y = true is 0.25p.
erefore, the failure probability is 0.5p + 0.25p 6 p.
Illustrating Proof Artifacts. We begin by describing the proof artifacts constructed by our
approach. e program ex1 is presented as a control-ow automaton over the alphabet of program
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in
if
th els
ac
x ⇠ bern(0.5)
[x]
y ⇠ bern(p) y ⇠ bern(0.5p)
in if th ac
[x] y ⇠ bern(p)
x ⇠ bern(0.5)
in if els ac
y ⇠ bern(0.5p)
x ⇠ bern(0.5)
[¬x]
[¬x]
true true ¬y
0 0 0 p
0 0 0 0.5p
true true ¬y
x ⇠ bern(0.5)
in if th ac
[x] y ⇠ bern(p)true ¬y
0 0.5 0.5 0.5+ p
t1
t2
t01
true
true
x x
An alternative annotation for t1
Fig. 3. A simple probabilistic program and possible trace annotations
statements, as shown in the le side of Fig. 3. Edge labels of the form [c] are guards (also known as
assume statements) encoding possible branches of the conditional statement. Accepted traces start
from the initial node in and end in the nal, accepting node ac.
fun ex1(p)
x ∼ bern(0.5)
if x then
y ∼ bern(p)
else
y ∼ bern(0.5p)
return y
Fig. 2. Loop-free example
Our verication approach focuses on one trace at a time. ere
are two possible traces in our example program: one through the
then branch and one through the else branch of the conditional.
We refer to these traces as τ1 and τ2, respectively.
To prove accuracy properties about each trace, our technique
annotates traces with auxiliary information. Let us consider the
annotated trace τ1 in Fig. 2. Each node along the trace is annotated
with two labels: (i) the top/blue label is a logical formula represent-
ing a set of reachable program states at that point (these can be
viewed as Hoare-style annotations); (ii) the boom/red label is an
expression representing the probability that the program does not
end up in the blue states. Consider node in from τ1: it is labeled
by true and 0, indicating that the probability of failing to arrive in a program state satisfying true
is 0 (as expected). However, consider node ac: it is labeled with ¬y and p, indicating that the
probability of failing to arrive in a state where y = false is at most p. e other program trace
τ2, which traverses the other branch, is similar; the annotation of τ2 demonstrates that its failure
probability is at most 0.5p.
At this point we have considered all of the ex1’s traces. If we naı¨vely sum up their probabilities of
failure to bound the total failure probability, we get a failure probability of at most p + 0.5p = 1.5p,
which is too weak—we wanted to prove an upper bound of p. However, we can give a more precise
analysis since the two traces consider two mutually disjoint events: one path assumes x is true
while the other assumes x is false. In this case, we can soundly take the maximum of the two failure
probabilities, 0.5p and p, arriving at a total failure probability of p and concluding the proof.1
Given a labeled trace, it is relatively straightforward to check if the annotations are valid.
However, constructing the annotations may not be so easy. e main challenge is selecting labels
for the results of sampling instructions—the invariants are not fully determined by the program,
and in general the proper choice depends on the target property we are trying to establish. For
instance, it is also possible to give an alternative annotation of τ1, denoted τ ′1 in Fig. 2. Node if is
1is argument is an instance of a more general proof technique over sets of traces represented as automata; we will later
formalize this idea as merging two automata.
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labeled with x and 0.5, indicating that the probability of not arriving in a state where x = true is at
most 0.5.
is annotated trace illustrates another general feature of our analysis: failure probabilities sum
up along traces. Intuitively, this principle corresponds to a basic property of probabilities called the
union bound: Pr(A ∪ B) 6 Pr(A) + Pr(B) for any two events A and B. In particular, if A and B are
interpreted as bad events—events violating labels at dierent nodes—the probability of any failure
occurring along a trace is at most the sum of the failure probabilities of individual steps. In τ ′1 , the
probability of y = true at node ac of τ ′1 is p, so the nal failure probability computed for this trace
is 0.5 + p. While this annotation in τ ′1 is sound, it is too weak to prove our desired property.
Encoding Trace Semantics. Our technique cleanly separates probabilistic assertions into two
pieces: a non-probabilistic component describing the state of program variables (the blue anno-
tations in Fig. 3), and a single number summarizing the probabilistic part of the assertion (the
red annotations in Fig. 3). As a result, we can reduce probabilistic reasoning to logical reasoning,
allowing us to harness the power of smt solvers and synthesis techniques.
To illustrate, we show how to construct trace labels for τ1. Our method proceeds in two steps.
First, like in traditional verication-condition generation, we encode the semantics of trace τ1 and
the specication as a logical formula, which, if valid, implies that `p {true} τ1 {¬y}. Specically,
we construct the following verication condition:2
∃fx , fy . ∀x ,y,ωi . (ω0 = 0 ∧ φ) ⇒ (¬y ∧ ω3 6 p) (1)
Above, φ is a set of conjuncts, each encoding the semantics of one statement in τ1:
φ , ©­«
fx = 1⇒ x ∧ ω1 = ω0 + 0.5
fx = 2⇒ ¬x ∧ ω1 = ω0 + 0.5
fx = 3⇒ ω1 = ω0
ª®¬︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
x∼bern(0.5)
∧ (x ∧ ω2 = ω1)︸           ︷︷           ︸
[x ]
∧ ©­«
fy = 1⇒ y ∧ ω3 = ω2 + 1 − p
fy = 2⇒ ¬y ∧ ω3 = ω2 + p
fy = 3⇒ ω3 = ω2
ª®¬︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
y∼bern(p)
Let us explain how the encoding models the program P . e variables ωi are fresh real-valued
variables that represent the probability of failure along the path—ω0, the initial probability at node
in, is constrained to 0. e right-hand side of the implication in Eq. (1) encodes the postcondition
¬y and the upper bound on the failure probability ω3 6 p.
e more interesting parts of the encoding are the existentially quantied variables fx , fy , which
appear in φ; we assume that fx , fy ∈ {1, 2, 3}. ese are used to select an axiomatization for each
sampling statement. Synthesizing the right values for fx and fy allows us to show that Eq. (1)
is valid, and therefore prove correctness of τ1. For instance, if fx is set to 1, then x ∼ bern(0.5)
is encoded as an assignment statement x ← true with an accumulated failure probability of 0.5,
since x is not true with a probability of 0.5; if fx is set to 3, then x is treated as a non-deterministic
Boolean, incurring no probability of failure.
It is not hard to check that any proof of validity of Eq. (1) must set fx = 3 and fy = 2, as otherwise
we cannot establish the postcondition, ¬y, or the upper bound on failure, p. In general, we treat
fx and fy as uninterpreted functions whose arguments are program inputs, so that the choice of
axiomatization may depend on the program state (§ 6 presents the general form).
Labels via Craig Interpolation. Suppose that we have proved validity of Eq. (1) and discovered
that seing fx = 3 and fy = 2 yields a satisable formula. Plugging these values into Eq. (1) and
2We have simplied some aspects of the encoding here; § 6 provides a formal treatment.
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negating the postcondition, we arrive at the following unsatisable formula:
ω0 = 0 ∧ ω1 = ω0︸   ︷︷   ︸
x∼bern(0.5)
∧x ∧ ω2 = ω1︸        ︷︷        ︸
[x ]
∧¬y ∧ ω3 = ω2 + p︸                ︷︷                ︸
y∼bern(p)
∧(y ∨ ω3 > p)
In rst-order logic, it is known that if A ∧ B is unsatisable, then there is a formula I over the
shared vocabulary of A and B such that A⇒ I and I ⇒ ¬B are valid. I is called a Craig interpolant.
Intuitively, an interpolant overapproximates A while maintaining unsatisability with B; this
overapproximation can be seen as trying to generalize the assertions as much as possible. In our
unsatisable formula above, we can compute a sequence of interpolants by spliing the formula
into A and B segments aer every statement’s encoding.3 e resulting interpolants compactly
encode the two labels on traces, the sets of states and probabilities of failure. E.g., consider the split:
A , ω0 = 0 ∧ ω1 = ω0︸   ︷︷   ︸
x∼bern(0.5)
∧x ∧ ω2 = ω1︸        ︷︷        ︸
[x ]
B , ¬y ∧ ω3 = ω2 + p︸                ︷︷                ︸
y∼bern(p)
∧(y ∨ ω3 > p)
A possible interpolant for A ∧ B is I , ω2 = 0. is indicates that any program state is reachable
at node th (since program variables are unconstrained in I ) with a probability of failure 0. e
interpolant condition ensures that I can only mention ω2, the only variable shared by A and B.
2.3 Illustrative Example: Handling Loops
fun ex2(q,n, ε,p)
i ← 0
while i < n do
a[i] ← lap(q[i], 1ε )
i ← i + 1
return a
Fig. 4. Example with a loop
We now consider a more complex example with loops, ex2 in
Fig. 4. ex2 is a simplied sketch of mechanisms from dieren-
tial privacy (Dwork et al. 2006), which carefully add random noise
to query results before disclosing them. e program ex2 takes an
array of integers q of length n, and constructs an array a whose
values are noisy versions of those in q. Specically, for each ele-
ment q[i], a[i] is noise drawn from the Laplace distribution with
mean q[i] and scale 1/ε , where ε > 0 is a real-valued input to the
program. (All primitive distributions are dened in § 3.)
Our goal is to prove the accuracy property `p ·n {true} ex2(q,n, ε) {φpost}, where the post-
condition is dened to be
φpost , ∀j ∈ [0,n). |a[j] − q[j]| 6 1
ε
log
(
1
p
)
.
In other words, for any p ∈ (0, 1], we want to verify that the dierence between a[j] and q[j] is
bounded by a function of ε and p. Observe that φpost involves input parameters q,n, ε , and p, but p
does not appear in the program—the accuracy property is a parameterized family of properties.
From our postcondition, we see that we can guarantee tighter bounds on the error—the dierence
between the exact answer q[j] and the noisy answer a[j]—if we are willing to allow this property to
be violated with larger probability p ·n. is style of postcondition is common for many randomized
algorithms, capturing the relationship between accuracy—how far the results are from the exact
values—and probability of failure, or how oen the target property will not hold.
Trace Generalization. e control-ow automaton representation of ex2 is shown in the box in
Fig. 5. While the total number of loop iterations is at most the input parameter n in the original
program, the automaton abstraction overapproximates these program behaviors with an innite
number of traces due to the loop. erefore, unlike our rst example, we cannot construct a proof
3Equivalently, we can encode the problem as solving recursion-free Horn clauses (Ru¨mmer et al. 2013).
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in w w1 w2
0
w’ ac
in w ac
0 0 0
in w
w1
w2
aci 0
[i < n]
[i > n]
i i+ 1
a[i] lap (q[i], 1/✏)
i 0 [i > n]
i 0 [i < n] a[i] lap(. . .) i i+ 1 [i > n]
true
i = 0true n 6 0
i 6 nj
j j j
i < n i < n
p · i p · i p · (i+ 1) p · i p · n
jpost
t1
t2
[i < n]
Fig. 5. A looping illustrative example
for every trace individually. Our technique proceeds by picking traces, proving them correct, and
generalizing them into automata representing innite sets.
Let us rst consider trace τ1 in Fig. 5; this trace does not enter the loop. e trace is easily shown
to be correct since not entering the loop implies that n 6 0, vacuously implying φpost with failure
probability 0. More interesting is trace τ2 in Fig. 5, which executes the loop body once and exits.
e formula φ in the annotation is dened as follows:
φ , ∀j ∈ [0, i). |a[j] − q[j]| 6 1
ε
log
(
1
p
)
Notice the probability of failure is p · i on nodes w, w1, w2, and w’. Aer loop exit, using the exit
condition, we conclude that the probability of failure is p · n. Informally, these labels capture the
fact that the failure probability depends on how many times we have executed the loop, which is
tracked in the counter i .
Our algorithm discovers that the labels are inductive: no maer how many times we execute the
loop, the probability of failing to satisfy φ ∧ i < n at loop entry is p · i . erefore, the algorithm
generalizes this trace into an innite set of traces by adding an edge from node w’ to w1 with the
statement [i < n]. With this additional edge in place, we now have an automaton representing all
traces that go through the loop at least once. e total failure probability of those traces is the label
under node ac: p · n. Combined with trace τ1, we have covered all the traces of ex2, proving that
the total probability of failure is p · n + 0 = p · n as desired.
Selecting Axioms for the Laplace Distribution. e sampling statement a[i] ∼ lap(. . .) in τ2
is encoded by the following logical formula:4
|a[i] − q[i]| 6 1ε log
(
1
fa (i,p,n)
)
∧ ω3 = ω2 + fa(i,p,n)
e le conjunct species that we can assume that the dierence between a[i] and q[i] is at most
1
ε log
(
1
fa (i,p,n)
)
; the right conjunct species that this assumption fails with a probability of fa(i,p,n).
We treat fa as an uninterpreted function with range (0, 1], so that there are innitely many possible
interpretations of fa corresponding to dierent failure probability/accuracy tradeos for the Laplace
distribution. To get the annotation proving correctness of τ2 in Fig. 5, our technique synthesizes
the interpretation fa(i,p,n) = p. With this choice, our analysis accumulates a probability of failure
of p for every loop iteration, ending up with a total probability of failure of p · n.
4In practice, we treat non-linear arithmetic operations and transcendentals (e.g., log) as uninterpreted functions and use the
theorem-enumeration technique recently proposed by Srikanth et al. (2017) to axiomatize them.
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Table 1. Distribution expressions and their semantics
Name Dist. expr. d Parameters Semantics s(d)
Bernoulli bern(e) e ∈ [0, 1] µ(true) = s(e) and µ(false) = 1 − s(e)
Uniform unif(e) e is a nite set µ(c) = 1/ |s(e) |, for c ∈ s(e)
Laplace lap(e1, e2) mean e1 ∈ Z; scale e2 ∈ R>0 µ(c) ∝ exp
(
− |c−s (e1)|s (e2)
)
, for c ∈ Z
Exponential exp(e1, e2) shi e1 ∈ Z; scale e2 ∈ R>0 µ(c) ∝ exp
(
− c−s (e1)s (e2)
)
, for c ∈ Z and c > s(e1)
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we formalize our program model and accuracy specications.
3.1 Program Model and Semantics
Probability Distributions. To model probabilistic computation mathematically, we use proba-
bility sub-distributions. A function µ : C → [0, 1] denes a discrete sub-distribution over a set C if
it is non-zero for at most countably many elements in C , and
∑
c ∈C µ(c) 6 1; we will abbreviate
discrete sub-distribution as distribution throughout this paper. We will oen write µ(C ′) for a
subset C ′ ⊆ C to mean ∑c ∈C ′ µ(c). We write dist(C) for the set of all distributions over C . e
support of a distribution µ is dened as supp(µ) , {c ∈ C | µ(c) > 0}.
We focus on discrete sub-distributions to keep measure-theory overhead to a minimum. As a
consequence, we only allow programs to sample from primitive discrete distributions. Support-
ing continuous primitive distributions (e.g., the Gaussian distribution) would not introduce any
diculties beyond requiring a more technically involved denition of the program semantics.
Program Expressions. We x a set of variables V that appear in the program. A program state s
is a map assigning every variable v ∈ V to a value. We will use S to denote the set of all possible
states. Given variable v , we use s(v) to denote the value of v in state s . Given constant c , we use
s[v 7→ c] to denote the state s with variable v mapped to c . e semantics of an expression e is a
function JeK : S → D from a state to an element of some type D. For instance, the expression x + y
in state s is interpreted as Jx + yK(s) = s(x) + s(y). We will oen abbreviate JeK(s) by s(e).
Distribution Expressions. A distribution expression d is interpreted as a distribution familyJdK : S → dist(D), mapping a state in S to a distribution over D with countable support. Our
framework can naturally handle any distribution expression that can be interpreted as a discrete
distribution. For concreteness, we will consider the four primitive distributions in Table 1.
Consider the Bernoulli distribution expression, bern(e). Given a state s , semantically bern(e) is
the distribution µ ∈ dist(B) where µ(true) = s(e) and µ(false) = 1 − s(e). Similarly, the uniform
distribution expression unif(e), where e encodes to a nite set, is interpreted as the distribution
assigning equal probability to every element in s(e).
We also use the (discrete) Laplace distribution, a common primitive distribution in the theory of
dierential privacy. For a state s , the distribution expression lap(e1, e2) is semantically the discrete
Laplace distribution with mean s(e1) and scale s(e2): for every integer c ∈ Z, it assigns a probability
proportional to exp
(
− |c−s(e1) |s(e2)
)
. e (discrete) exponential distribution expression exp(e1, e2) is
similar, but only assigning positive probability to integers above the shi s(e1).
We implicitly assume that arguments of distribution expressions are well-typed and valid.
Programs, Statements, and Traces. Our verication technique will target programs wrien in
a probabilistic, imperative language. e basic statements are drawn from a set Σ:
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Jv ← eK(s) , unit(s[v 7→ JeK(s)]) Jv ∼ dK(s) , bind(JdK(s), λx . unit(s[v 7→ x]))Jassume(b)K(s) , if JbK(s) then unit(s) else 0 Jst ; τ K(s) , bind(JstK(s), Jτ K)
Fig. 6. Statement and trace semantics
• Assignment statements v ← e, where e is an expression over V , e.g., v1 +v2.
• Sampling statements v ∼ d, where d is a distribution expression.
• Assume statements assume(b), where b is a Boolean expression over V .
A trace τ is a nite sequence of statements st1; · · · ; stn , and a program P is interpreted as a (possibly
innite) set of traces L(P). We include full details of the programming language in Appendix C
in the supplementary materials; the interpretation is standard, using assume statements to model
typical control-ow constructs. For instance, a conditional statement if b then τ1 else τ2 can be
modeled as the pair of traces assume(b);τ1 and assume(¬b);τ2. By construction, traces in L(P) are
semantically disjoint—no trace in L(P) is a prex of (or equal to) any other trace in L(P), and the
rst diering statements between any two traces are of the form assume(b) and assume(¬b).
Trace Semantics. We interpret a trace τ as a function Jτ K : S → dist(S) from input states
to distributions over output states. To dene this semantics formally, we need two standard
constructions on distributions. e map unit : D → dist(D) maps a ∈ D to the Dirac distribution
δa at a, i.e., the distribution that returns 1 at a and 0 otherwise. e map bind : dist(D1) →
(D1 → dist(D2)) → dist(D2) combines probabilistic computations in sequence: bind(µ, f )(a2) =∑
a1∈D1 µ(a1) · f (a1)(a2). ese maps are the usual unit and bind for the (sub-)distribution monad.
en, we can give semantics to basic statements and traces as shown in Fig. 6. Finally, the semantics
of a program P is dened as the aggregate of its traces. Formally, JPK : S → dist(S) is dened as
JPK(s) , ∑
τ ∈L(P )
Jτ K(s)
where each term Jτ K(s) is the output distribution from running τ starting from input s , and the sum
of distributions is dened pointwise. For any disjoint set of traces corresponding to a program P ,
the sum on the right-hand side is indeed a distribution.
3.2 Programs as Automata
We can encode the set of possible traces of a program P as a regular language L(P) represented
by all paths through its control-ow graph. We begin with a general denition of automata over
program statements, and then show how we represent programs as automata.
Automata over Statements. A nite-state automaton over statements A is a graph 〈Q,δ〉, where
• Q is a nite set of nodes.
• δ ⊆ Q × Σ ×Q is the transition relation, where Σ are basic statements.
• qin,qac ∈ Q are special nodes called the initial and accepting nodes, respectively.
We will use qi
st−→ qj to denote that 〈q1, st,qj 〉 ∈ δ . We write L(A) for the language of traces accepted
by A, where a trace st1, . . . , stn is accepted i {qin st1−→ q1,q1 st2−→ q2, . . . ,qn−1 stn−→ qac} ⊆ δ . It will
sometimes be useful to use multiple automata to model the traces in a single program. We will use
L(A) to denote the union of all languages accepted by a set of automata A, i.e., ⋃A∈A L(A).
We assume that all nodes q ∈ Q can reach the accepting node qac via the transition relation δ , and
that there are no transitions starting from qac. We also assume that automata model well-formed
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control ow, i.e., (i) all nodes qi ∈ Q have at most two outgoing transitions and (ii) if qi st1−→ qj and
qi
st2−→ qk for j , k , then st1, st2 are of the form assume(b1) and assume(b2), such that b1 ≡ ¬b2.
From Program Traces to Automata We will identify a program with an automaton representing
its its control-ow graph (cfg). A program P is of the form 〈L,δ〉, where the nodes L of the automaton
denote the set of program locations (e.g., line numbers). e special nodes `in, `ac ∈ L model the
rst and last lines of the program. To ensure there is no control-ow non-determinism, we assume
that for any `i
assume(b)−−−−−−−→ `j , there is a transition `i assume(¬b)−−−−−−−−→ `k .
We use V in ⊆ V to denote the set of input variables, which are not modied by the program.
We will also use V det ⊆ V to denote the set of program variables whose values are assigned
deterministically, i.e., not aected by probabilistic choice—by denition, V in ⊆ V det. (We may not
be able to determine V det exactly in practice, but we can under-approximate it via a simple static
analysis.)
3.3 Probabilistic Accuracy Properties
We will dene specications using the Hoare-style statement
`β {φpre} τ {φpost}
where the precondition φpre ⊆ S and postcondition φpost ⊆ S are sets of program states, and the
failure probability β is a [0, 1]-valued function over input variablesV in. For simplicity, we will treat
β as an expression over V in—e.g., 0 or p · n in § 2.3—and use s(β) to denote the value of β in state s .
We say that `β {φpre} τ {φpost} is valid i for any state s ∈ φpre, we have µ(φpost) 6 s(β), where
µ = Jτ K(s) and φpost = S \φpost. In other words, the probability that the trace starts in φpre and does
not end up in φpost is upper bounded by β . We extend this notation to programs P in the natural
way, writing `β {φpre} P {φpost} i for any input state s ∈ φpre, the output distribution µ = JPK(s)
satises the bound µ(φpost) 6 s(β).
4 TRACE ABSTRACTION MODULO PROBABILITY
With the preliminaries out of the way, we begin to introduce a version of trace abstraction for
probabilistic programs and show how to use it to prove accuracy specications. Given a program
P , suppose we want to establish the following accuracy specication: `β {φpre} P {φpost}. We will
overapproximate the traces of P with a set of automata A and analyze each automaton separately;
this way, we can focus on smaller groups of possible traces. If we can show that the probability
φpost does not hold across all automata is at most β , this implies the accuracy specication. We
formalize this argument in the following proof rule. (We defer all proofs to Appendix A in the
supplementary materials.)
Theorem 4.1 (General proof rule). e specication `β {φpre} P {φpost} is valid if there exists
a set of automata A such that
L(P) ⊆ L(A) (Trace inclusion)
∀s ∈ φpre.
∑
τ ∈L(A)
Jτ K(s)(φpost) 6 s(β) (Failure probability upper bound)
is proof rule is concise but dicult to apply in practice, even given the set of automata
A—while the trace inclusion property can be checked via regular language inclusion, the failure
probability upper bound is more complicated. To make this second condition easier to check, we
enrich the automata with additional information on each state; local properties of these labeled
automata will then imply the failure probability upper bound.
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Enriching Automata with Labels. We work with automata where every node is labeled with a
predicate on states (equivalently, a set of states), and a function representing the failure probability—
we call such automata failure automata. e rough intuition is that at each node q, the predicate
label represents a program invariant that holds on all traces reaching q from the beginning of the
program, except with probability given by the failure probability label.
Denition 4.2 (Failure automata). A failure automaton A = 〈Q,δ , λ,κ〉 is an automaton 〈Q,δ〉
with two labeling functions, λ and κ, where
• λ maps every node q ∈ Q to a set of states, and
• κ maps every node q ∈ Q to a [0,1]-valued function over V det.
We say that A is well-labeled i the following conditions hold:
(1) κ(qin) = 0 and κ(qac) is a [0, 1]-valued function over the input variables V in ⊆ V det, and
(2) for every transition qi
st−→ qj , the statement `wpf (κ(qj ),st)−κ(qi ) {λ(qi )} st {λ(qj )}, is valid
where wpf is a weakest-precondition operation over failure-probabilities: wpf(e, st) , e for
assume and sampling statements, and wpf(e1,v ← e2) , e1[v 7→ e2].

e two conditions ensure that if we take any trace τ ∈ L(A), then `κ(qac) {λ(qin)} τ {λ(qac)} is
valid. Point (2) ensures that failure probability accumulates additively as we move along the trace,
starting from being 0 at qin, as stipulated by point (1). Crucially, both points are local conditions:
they can be easily checked given a failure automaton. However, coming up with well-labeled
automata for a given program is not at all trivial—we return to this question in the next two
sections.
Example 4.3. Recall our example from § 2.2, illustrated in Fig. 3. e lower part of Fig. 3 shows a
failure automaton named τ ′1 with λ and κ shown above and below the nodes, respectively. Notice
that the initial node in is labeled with λ(in) , true and κ(in) , 0. Focusing on the edge from node
th, the labeling at ac satises condition (2) for well-labeledness in eorem 4.2. e condition says
that the following statement must be valid: `p {x} y ∼ bern(p) {¬y}. e failure probability p is
the simplication of the expression wpf(0.5+p,y ∼ bern(p)) − 0.5. e statement is valid since y is
true with probability p aer executing y ∼ bern(p). 
e following theorem establishes soundness of annotations on well-labeled automata. Speci-
cally, the failure probability label on qac—namely, κ(qac)—is an upper bound on the probability that
executions through A do not end up in a state in λ(qac).
Theorem 4.4 (Well-labeled automata soundness). Let A be a well-labeled failure automaton.
en, for every s ∈ λ(qin) and µ = Jτ K(s), we have ∑τ ∈L(A) µ(λ(qac)) 6 s(κ(qac)).
Proofs fromWell-labeled Automata. Now that we have established soundness of well-labeled
automata, we rene our original proof rule (eorem 4.1) using failure automata. e following
theorem demonstrates how to establish correctness using a set of failure automata.
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initA −→ ∅
τ ∈ L(P) ∩ L(A) Aτ = label(τ ,φpre,φpost, β)
traceA −→ A ∪ {Aτ }
A = 〈Q,δ , λ,κ〉 ∈ A qi ,qj ∈ Q st ∈ Σ
A′ = 〈Q,δ ∪ {qi st−→ qj }, λ,κ〉 `wpf (κ(qj ),st)−κ(qi ) {λ(qi )} st {λ(qj )} generalizeA −→ (A \ {A}) ∪ {A′}
A1,A2 ∈ A A = A1 !A2
mergeA −→ (A \ {A1,A2}) ∪A
L(P) ⊆ L(A) ∀s ∈ φpre.∑ |A |i=1 s(κi (qaci )) 6 s(β) correct`β {φpre} P {φpost}
Fig. 7. Overall abstract algorithm
Theorem 4.5 (Proof rule with failure automata). e statement `β {φpre} P {φpost} is valid
if there exist well-labeled automata A = {A1, . . . ,An} such that the following conditions hold:
L(P) ⊆ L(A) (Trace inclusion)
∀i ∈ [1,n].φpre ⊆ λi (qini ) (Precondition inclusion)
∀i ∈ [1,n]. λi (qaci ) ⊆ φpost (Postcondition inclusion)
∀s ∈ φpre.
n∑
i=1
s(κi (qaci )) 6 s(β) (Failure probability upper bound)
e trace, precondition, and postcondition inclusion conditions are the same as in trace abstrac-
tion for non-probabilistic programs. e failure probability upper bound condition ensures that the
overapproximation of failure probability resulting from abstraction does not exceed β . Notice that
precondition and postcondition inclusion checks can be performed using an smt solver, assuming
labels are encoded in a supported rst-order theory. Similarly, the failure probability upper bound
condition involves summing up the labels on the accepting nodes of all failure automata, allowing
us to perform the check with an smt solver.
Example 4.6. Recall the example program ex2 from § 2.3, illustrated in Fig. 5. e two automata,
denoted τ1 and τ2 in Fig. 5, are well-labeled. e automata cover all program traces. e initial nodes,
denoted in, have the labels λ as true, therefore satisfying the precondition inclusion condition. e
accepting nodes, denoted ac, both imply the postcondition, φpost. Finally, the sum of the failure
probabilities on accepting nodes is 0 + p · n 6 p · n, satisfying the failure probability condition. 
5 CONSTRUCTING TRACE ABSTRACTIONS
eorem 4.5 reduces checking accuracy properties to nding a set of well-labeled automata. Our
algorithm for automating this proof rule is technically complex, and spans the following two
sections. Here, we will present the algorithm and prove soundness, assuming a procedure for
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well-labeling single traces; we will detail this last piece in § 6. en, we compare our algorithm
with two existing techniques: the union bound logic ahl, and standard trace abstraction.
5.1 Algorithm Overview
Our algorithm maintains a set {Ai }i of well-labeled failure automata modeling some of the program
traces, and repeatedly nds traces τ ∈ L(P) that are not in {Ai }i . If a trace can be well-labeled,
it is converted into a well-labeled automaton Ai proving that `β {φpre} τ {φpost} and added to
the current automaton set. roughout, the algorithm may simplify or transform the automaton
set by merging automata together and generalizing automata by adding new edges. e process
terminates successfully if the set of failure automata {Ai }i satises the conditions in eorem 4.5.
e input to the algorithm is a program P , a pre- and post-condition φpre and φpost, and a target
failure probability β , a function over the input variables of the program. e entire algorithm
is presented in Fig. 7 as a set of non-deterministic guarded rules. e algorithm preserves the
invariant that the set of automata A are well-labeled. We briey consider each rule in turn.
Initialization. e rule init is the only rule with no premises and serves as the initialization rule.
Not surprisingly, the set of failure automata A is initially empty.
Trace Sampling. e rule trace picks a trace τ that is in the program P but not covered by the set
of automata A. It then uses the function label to construct a well-labeled automaton Aτ implying
that `β {φpre} τ {φpost}. We will detail the label operation in § 6; for now, we just note that label
may fail, in which case the rule trace does not re and the algorithm tries a dierent trace.
Generalizing Automata. e rule generalize expands the language L(A) by adding new edges
to an automaton A ∈ A. When the new edges form loops, this rule can be seen as generalizing
from automata modeling nite unrollings of looping statements to automata overapproximating
loops. e side-conditions ensure that this transformation preserves well-labeledness.
Merging Automata. e rule merge combines automata whose traces are mutually exclusive,
allowing us to take the maximum failure probability instead of the sum. Intuitively, automata
that begin with the same prex of statements before making mutually exclusive assumptions—say,
assume(b) and assume(¬b)—can have their prexes merged together if they have equivalent labels.
is operation can be seen as constructing an automaton combining two branches of a conditional.
Concretely, the operator ! takes two automata, A1 and A2, and returns a new automaton that
accepts the union of the traces. We formalize ! and its preconditions below:
Denition 5.1. We assume the two automata A1,A2 are of the form Ai = 〈Qi ,δi , λi ,κi 〉 with the
initial and nal nodes qini ,qaci . Suppose there is a prex of statements st1, . . . , stn such that
(1) every path from qin1 to qac1 is of the form qin1
st1−→ q1,1 st2−→ q1,2 . . .q1,n assume(b)−−−−−−−→ q1,n+1 · · ·qac1 .
(2) every path fromqin2 toqac2 is of the formqin2
st1−→ q2,1 st2−→ q2,2 . . .q2,n assume(¬b)−−−−−−−−→ q2,n+1 · · ·qac2 .
(3) each prex node q ∈ {qin1 ,q1,1, . . . ,q1,n} has equivalent labels (λ and κ) to its corresponding
node in {qin2 ,q2,1, . . . ,q2,n}.
en, A1 !A2 yields a failure automaton A = 〈Q,δ , λ,κ〉 with
• Q = Q1 ∪ (Q2 \ {qin2 ,q2,1, . . . ,q2,n ,qac2 });
• δ = δ1 ∪ δ2 ∪ {qi st−→ qac | qi st−→ qac2 ∈ δ2}, with all edges to/from undened nodes removed;
• qin = qin1 and qac = qac1 ;
• λ agrees with λ1 and λ2, except that λ(qac) = λ(qac1 ) ∪ λ(qac2 ); and
• κ agrees with κ1 and κ2, except that κ(qac) = max(κ(qac1 ),κ(qac2 )).
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x ⇠ bern(0.5) [x]
x ⇠ bern(0.5) [¬x]
true
0
0
true
A1
A2
y 0
y 0
0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5
¬x
x
false false
false false
(a) Example demonstrating!’s condition (3)
x ⇠ bern(0.5)
in if th ac
[x] y ⇠ bern(p)
els y ⇠ b
ern
(0.5
p)
[¬x]
true true ¬y
0 0 0
0
true
true
p
(b) Example demonstrating! on ex1
Fig. 8. Merge examples
More advanced extensions of this operation are also possible, for instance, also merging common
post-xes along with common prexes, but we stick with this version for concreteness. 
If two automata are well-labeled and themerge rule applies, then the resulting merged automaton
is also well-labeled. It is, however, important to note condition (3) in eorem 5.1, which states that
the shared prex between the two automata must have the same labels on both automata. If that
condition is violated, the result may not be well-labeled, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.2. Consider the two well-labeled single-trace automata A1 and A2 in Fig. 8(a), which
model a conditional statement and share the prex x ∼ bern(0.5). e annotations prove that both
traces satisfy `0.5 {true} Ai {y > 0}. e operation ! does not apply here, since the automata
disagree on the label of the second node. However, suppose that we apply ! nonetheless. is
results in a nal node with failure probability max(0.5, 0.5) = 0.5. But this is not sound, since the
probability of failing to achieve y > 0 is 1 when both traces are considered together, since both
traces set y to 0. 
We also give an example of a sound application of merge.
Example 5.3. Consider the two well-labeled automata τ1 and τ2 from Fig. 3 in § 2.2. ey satisfy
the conditions for !. Fig. 8(b) shows the result of applying ! to these two automata. Notice that
the accepting node, denoted ac, has a label κ(ac) = max(p, 0.5p), which is equal to p. 
Lemma 5.4. IfA1,A2 are well-labeled and satisfy the! conditions, thenA = A1!A2 is well-labeled.
Termination. Finally, the rule correct gives the termination condition for the algorithm, corre-
sponding to the conditions from eorem 4.5. Notice that precondition and postcondition inclusion
hold by construction, since they were ensured by the labeling function label when the rst trace in
each automaton was added to the automaton set by rule trace.
5.2 Theoretical Properties
Soundness. As expected, the algorithm is sound.
Theorem 5.5 (Soundness of algorithm). If correct applies, then `β {φpre} P {φpost} is valid.
(In)completeness. Our approach is generally incomplete. e incompleteness primarily results
from the application of the union bound, which, in some programs, does not allow us to prove the
tightest possible failure probabilities. E.g., consider `0.75 {true} x ∼ bern(0.5);y ∼ bern(0.5) {x∧y}.
Any well-labeled automaton will upper bound the failure probability by 1, since we have no means
of assuming independent sampling in both statements. is example can be handled by coalescing
the two sampling statements into a single statement; however, the general issue arises in loops, too.
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Nevertheless, we can compare the expressivity of our approach with two existing techniques:
the union bound logic (Barthe et al. 2016b) and trace abstraction (Heizmann et al. 2009, 2013).
Union Bound Logic. e union bound logic (Barthe et al. 2016b) is an extension of Hoare logic
with failure probabilities, where Hoare triples are analogous to our annotations `β {φpre} P {φpost}.
Our notion of well-labeled automata can capture proofs in the union bound logic with the exception
of a few points, and our algorithm can recover a precise class of well-labeled automata. We formalize
this correspondence and prove a completeness result in Appendix C in the supplementary materials.
Trace Abstraction. Our technique generalizes trace abstraction for non-probabilistic, single-
procedure programs (Heizmann et al. 2009, 2013). When given a non-probabilistic program P and
Hoare triple {φpre} P {φpost}, we can construct trace-abstraction proofs by simply seing the failure
probability upper bound to 0 in the specication. Consequently, the failure probability labels of
nodes of all automata in A must be 0 for the proof to hold. In this seing, the state labels (λ) are
overapproximations of reachable states at a specic node, corresponding to the annotations of
Floyd–Hoare automata dened by Heizmann et al. (2013).
6 LABELING INDIVIDUAL TRACES: PROOFS AND INTERPOLATION
In the algorithm we presented in Fig. 7, the key subroutine is the label operation for rule trace.
Recall that given a single trace τ , pre- and post-conditions φpre and φpost, and failure probability
β , label aempts to construct a well-labeled automaton Aτ for τ proving `β {φpre} τ {φpost}. We
now show how to reduce this task to a constraint-solving problem. Our approach is inspired by
interpolation-based verication (McMillan 2006), where the semantics of τ are encoded as a formula
in rst-order logic to check if it can falsify a Hoare triple. If the trace does not falsify the triple,
Craig interpolants are computed along the trace forming a Hoare-style annotation. However, our
seing is richer: we need to (i) handle traces with probabilistic semantics and (ii) construct two
kinds of annotations—sets of states and failure probability expressions. We demonstrate how to
reduce this problem to Craig interpolation over a rst-order theory, thus eliminating probabilistic
reasoning. We summarize our approach below:
(1) Axiomatizing distributions: We demonstrate how to encode `β {φpre} τ {φpost} as a
logical formula. e key challenge is in encoding semantics of sampling statements. We
address this challenge by observing that we can encode sampling statements by introducing
appropriate logical axioms about the distributions. is results in a constraint-based synthesis
problem of the form ∃f . ∀X .φ, where discovering a function f amounts to nding an
appropriate axiom for each sampling statement in order to establish correctness of the
trace.
(2) Craig interpolation: Once we have solved the synthesis problem by nding a solution for
f , we are le with a valid logical formula of the form ∀X .φ, which we can use to compute
interpolants using standard techniques. We demonstrate that these interpolants can be
converted to a well-labeling of Aτ .
6.1 Proofs via Distribution Axiomatization
We now describe how we can check validity of the specication `β {φpre} st1; · · · ; stn {φpost}. Our
approach is analogous to logical encodings of program paths in verication of non-probabilistic
programs; there, each statement sti is encoded as a formula φsti in some appropriate rst-order
theory, e.g., the theories of linear arithmetic or arrays. Novel to our seing, we use distribution
axioms to approximate the semantics of sampling statements in a rst-order theory.
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Table 2. Example families of distribution axioms (v does not occur in dist. expr.)
Statement Assumption φax Upperbound eub Parameters
Bernoulli: v ∼ bern(v ′) (f (V in) = 1 ∧ v) ∨ (f (V in) = 2 ∧ ¬v)
v ′ if f (V in) = 1
1 − v ′ if f (V in) = 2
0 otherwise
f (V in) ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Uniform: v ∼ unif(v ′) v ∈ f (V in) |f (V in) |/ |v ′ | f (V in) ⊆ v ′
Laplace: v ∼ lap(v1, v2) |v − v1 | > v2 log
(
1
f (V in)
)
f (V in) f (V in) ∈ (0, 1]
Exponential: v ∼ exp(v1, v2) v < v1 ∨ v − v1 > v2 log
(
2
f (V in)
)
f (V in) f (V in) ∈ (0, 1]
Logical eory. We assume that deterministic program expressions correspond to a rst-order
theory, like linear arithmetic. Given a formula φ, a model M of φ, denoted M |= φ, is a valuation of
its free variables fv(φ) satisfying the formula—e.g., M |= x + y > 0 where M = {x 7→ 0,y 7→ 1}.
We use M(φ) to denote φ with all free variables replaced by their interpretation in M . A formula φ
is satisable if there exists M such that M |= φ; a formula is valid if M |= φ for all models M .
Distribution Axioms. Given a sampling statement v ∼ d, an axiom is of the form
Prv∼d[φax] 6 eub
where eub is a [0,1]-valued expression over V and φax is a formula over V . e axiom must be true
for all possible valuations of the program variables V \ {v}. We will use the axioms as follows:
When encoding the eect of a sampling statement v ∼ d, we can assume that ¬φax is true, with
a failure probability of at most eub. is allows us to sidestep probabilistic reasoning and encode
program semantics in our rst-order theory.
Since axioms are approximations of primitive distributions, there are many possible axioms for
any given distribution. In some cases, axioms may be parameterized, e.g., by the failure probability.
We call parameterized axioms axiom families; Table 2 collects example axiom families for the
distributions in § 3.1.
Denition 6.1 (Laplace axiom family). Recall that the (discrete) Laplace distribution expression
lap(v1,v2) is parameterized by two parameters, the mean v1 ∈ Z and the scale v2 ∈ R. Sampling
from lap(v1,v2) returns an integerv with probability proportional to exp(−|v−v1 |/v2). e Laplace
distribution supports the following family of axioms, parameterized by a (0, 1]-valued function f :
Prv∼lap(v1,v2)
[
|v −v2 | > 1
v1
log
(
1
f (V in)
)]
6 f (V in)
Dierent instantiations of f yield dierent axioms. 
e exponential distribution’s axiom family is similar; note that exp(v1,v2) has zero probability
of returning elements smaller than v1, and this information is incorporated into the axiom. e
Bernoulli distribution’s family is parameterized by a function f (V in) which decides whether to
assume v is true, false or treat it non-deterministically. e uniform distribution’s axiom family is
parameterized by a function f (V in) returning a subset of the set dened by v ′.
Example 6.2. Recall trace τ2 (from program ex2) in § 2.3 and Fig. 5, which contains the statement
a[i] ∼ lap(q[i], 1/ε). To prove correctness of τ2, we instantiated the Laplace axiom family with
f (V in) = p where p ∈ V in, yielding the axiom Pra[i]∼lap(q[i],1/ε )
[
|a[i] − q[i]| > 1ε log
(
1
p
)]
6 p. 
Theorem 6.3. Each axiom in Table 2 is sound: given any input state s and well-typed distribution
expression d, the probability that φax holds in s(d) is at most s(eub).
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enc(i,v ← e) , v = e ∧ ωi = ωi−1 ∧ hi = hi−1
enc(i, assume(b)) , ωi = ωi−1 ∧ hi = (hi−1 ∨ ¬b)
enc(i,v ∼ d) , ωi = ωi−1 + eub ∧ hi = (hi−1 ∨ φax) given axiom family: Prv∼d[φax] 6 eub
Fig. 9. Logical encoding of statement semantics
Logical Encoding. We now present our encoding for checking `β {φpre} τ {φpost}. First, without
loss of generality, we assume that τ is in static single assignment (ssa) form; this ensures that
variables are not assigned to more than once, simplifying our encoding. We also assume that φpre
and φpost are logical formulas over program variables. Our encoding explicitly maintains failure
probability using a special set of real-valued variables ωi , which encode failure probability aer
statement sti along τ . In order to encode failure probability on unsatisable subtraces, we also use
a special set of Boolean variables hi to track if an execution was blocked by an assume statement.
e function enc, dened in Fig. 9, is used to encode assignment, assume, and sampling statements;
it maintains the variables ωi ,hi and axiomatizes sampling statements using the aforementioned
distribution axioms. Consider, for instance, the encoding for assignment statements: it constrains
v to e, while maintaining the same failure probability and blocked status, ωi and hi . Intuitively, the
semantics of assignment statements is precisely captured by our logical encoding, so assignment
statements do not increase the probability of failure. In contrast, the probability of failure increases
when an axiom is applied for a sampling statement. Concretely, if the axiom family Prv∼d[φax] 6 eub
is applied, we assume that ¬φax is true while accumulating probability of failure eub, as encoded in
the constraint ωi = ωi−1 + eub.
e following theorem formalizes the encoding of `β {φpre} τ {φpost} and states its correctness.
Theorem 6.4 (Soundness of logical encoding). e specication `β {φpre} st1, . . . , stn {φpost}
is valid if the following formula is satisable:
∀V ,ωi ,hi .
(
φpre ∧ ω0 = 0 ∧ h0 = false ∧
n∧
i=1
enc(i, sti )
)
=⇒ (ωn 6 β ∧ (¬hn ⇒ φpost)) (2)
Observe that in the above encoding the only free symbols are the uninterpreted functions
f1, . . . , fm introduced by the axiom families used in the encoding of sampling statements. us,
checking satisability involves synthesizing interpretations for f1, . . . , fm . (Equivalently, we can
think of f1, . . . , fm as existentially quantied so that we check validity of ∃f1, . . . , fm∀V . . ..)
Example 6.5. Recall the trace τ1 from § 2.2 and Fig. 3 (program ex1), where we proved:
`p {true} x ∼ bern(0.5)︸           ︷︷           ︸
st1
; assume(x)︸      ︷︷      ︸
st2
;y ∼ bern(p)︸        ︷︷        ︸
st3
{¬y}
Using the encoding in eorem 6.4, we get the following formula:
∀x ,y,p,ωi ,hi .
(
ω0 = 0 ∧ h0 = false ∧
3∧
i=1
enc(i, sti )
)
=⇒ (ω3 6 p ∧ (¬h3 ⇒ ¬y))
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To illustrate, enc(1,x ∼ bern(0.5)) is the following constraint, using the axiom family in Table 2:
ω1 = ω0 +

0.5 if fx (p) = 1
0.5 if fx (p) = 2
0 otherwise
︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
eub
∧
©­­­«h1 = h0 ∨ (fx (p) = 1 ∧ x) ∨ (fx (p) = 2 ∧ ¬x)︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸¬φax
ª®®®¬
e proof in § 2.2 used the interpretation fx (p) = 3, allowing x to take any value. 
6.2 From Synthesis to Craig Interpolation
Now that we have dened our logical constraints, we can apply Craig interpolation on the above
encoding in eorem 6.4 to construct the labeling functions, λ and κ, for an automaton accepting τ .
Craig Interpolants. e standard notion of sequence interpolants (McMillan 2006) generalizes
Craig interpolants between two formulas to a sequence of unsatisable formulas in rst-order
logic.
Denition 6.6 (Sequence interpolants). Let
∧n
i=1 φi be unsatisable. ere exists a sequence of
formulasψ1, . . . ,ψn such that:
(1) φ1 ⇒ ψ1 andψn ⇒ false are valid,
(2) for all i ∈ (1,n),ψi ∧ φi+1 ⇒ ψi+1 is valid, and
(3) fv(ψi ) ⊆ fv(φ1, . . . ,φi ) ∩ fv(φi+1, . . . ,φn).
Note that sequence interpolation is equivalent to solving a form of recursion-free Horn clauses (Ru¨mmer
et al. 2013); we use an interpolation-based presentation to reduce notational overhead. 
Labeling Automata via Interpolation. Suppose that we have discovered interpretations for
f1, . . . , fm that satisfy Eq. (3) from eorem 6.4. is implies that the following formula, which is
Eq. (3) aer negating it and instantiating f1, . . . , fm with their interpretations, is unsatisable:(
φpre ∧ ω0 = 0 ∧
n∧
i=1
enc(i, sti )
)
∧ ¬(ωn 6 β ∧ (¬hn ⇒ φpost))
It follows that we can construct a sequence of Craig interpolants for the following problem:
φpre ∧ ω0 = 0︸          ︷︷          ︸
φ0
∧ enc(1, st1)︸     ︷︷     ︸
φ1
∧ · · · ∧ enc(n, stn)︸     ︷︷     ︸
φn
∧¬(ωn 6 β ∧ (¬hn ⇒ φpost))︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
φn+1
Every interpolantψi encodes the set of reachable states and the failure probability aer executing
the rst i program statements beginning from a state in φpre. e free-variable condition for
interpolants implies that the only free variables inψi are hi ,ωi , and live program variables aer the
ith statement. e challenge is that interpolants describe both the program state invariants and the
failure probability invariants, corresponding to the λ and κ needed to label the failure automaton.
Fortunately, these labels can be extracted from the interpolants. e following theorem formalizes
the transformation and states its correctness.
Theorem 6.7 (Well-labelings from interpolants). Let {ψi }i be the interpolants computed as
shown above. LetAτ = 〈Q,δ , λ,κ〉 be the failure automaton that accepts only the trace τ = st1, . . . , stn ,
i.e., δ = {qin st1−→ q1,q1 st2−→ q2, . . .qn−1 stn−→ qac}. Set the labeling functions as follows:
(1) λ(qin) , φpre and κ(qin) , 0.
(2) λ(qi ) , ∃ωi .ψi [hi 7→ false] and λ(qac) , ∃ωn .ψn[hn 7→ false].
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`0.25 {true}
fun randResp(priv)
r ∼ unif({0, 1}2)
if fst(r ) = 1 then
ans← priv
else
ans← snd(r )
return ans
{ans ⇐⇒ priv}
`p {ε > 0}
fun noisyMax(Q, d, ε )
b, max, i ← ⊥, ⊥, 1
a ← Z[ |Q |]
while i 6 |Q | do
q ← Qi (d )
ai ∼ lap(q, 2ε )
if ai > max ∨ b = ⊥ then
b← i
max← ai
i ← i + 1
return b{
∀j ∈ [1, |Q |].Qb(d ) > Q j (d ) − 4ε log |Q |p
}
`p {ε > 0}
fun aboveT(Q, d, T , ε )
i, done← 1, false
t ∼ lap(T , 1ε )
while i 6 |Q | ∧ ¬done do
q ← Qi (d )
a ∼ lap(q, 2ε )
if a > t then
done← true
i ← i + 1
ans← done ? i − 1 : ⊥
return ans
{(ans , ⊥ ⇒ φ>) ∧ (ans = ⊥ ⇒ φ⊥)}
`p {ε > 0}
fun noisySum(Q, d, ε )
s ← 0
i ← 1
a ← Z[ |Q |]
while i 6 |Q | do
q ← Qi (d )
ai ∼ lap(q, 1ε )
s ← s + ai
i ← i + 1
return s{
|s −∑|Q |j=1 Q j (d ) | 6 |Q |ε log |Q |p }
`p {ε > 0}
fun expMech(R, u, d, ε )
rb ← ⊥
max ← 0
for r ∈ R do
util ← u(r, d )
nu← exp(util, 2ε )
if nu > max ∨ rb = ⊥ then
rb ← r
max ← nu
return rb{
∀j ∈ R . u(rb, d ) > u(j, d ) − 2ε log 2|R |p
}
`p {ε > 0}
fun sparseVec(Q, d, T , ε )
i, done← 1, false
t ∼ lap(T , 1ε )
while i 6 |Q | ∧ ¬done do
q ← Qi (d )
a ∼ lap(q, 2ε )
if a > t then
noisy ∼ lap(q, 1ε )
done← true
i ← i + 1
ans← done ? (i − 1, noisy) : ⊥
return ans{(ans , ⊥ ⇒ φ′>) ∧ (ans = ⊥ ⇒ φ′⊥)}
φ> ,
{∀j ∈ [1, ans).Q j (d ) 6 T + 2ε log 2|Q |p + 1ε log 2p
Qans(d ) > T − 2ε log 2|Q |p − 1ε log 2p
φ⊥ , ∀j ∈ [1, |Q |].Q j (d ) 6 T + 2ε log 2|Q |p + 1ε log 2p
We elide φ′> and φ′⊥, which are dened similarly.
Fig. 10. Privacy-preserving algorithms and their accuracy specifications
(3) κ(qi ) , f (V det), where f (V det) is the function that returns, for any valuation of V det, the
largest value of ωi that satises ∃V \V det. ∃hi .ψi . For κ(qac), we use ∃V \V in. ∃hn .ψn .
en, Aτ is well-labeled and implies `β {φpre} τ {φpost}.
Notice that for λ we set hi to be false, since we are only interested in states that pass assume
statements (reachable states). We existentially quantify ωi , as it is not a program variable. Also
notice the technicality in constructing κ; this arises because the interpolant is a relation over values
of ωi and V det, while the label of κ(qi ) is technically a function from V det to [0,1]. In practice, we
need not construct the function f ; we can perform all needed checks using relations.
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDIES
7.1 Overview of Implementation
We have implemented our approach atop the Z3 smt solver (de Moura and Bjørner 2008). We encode
statements using the following rst-order theories: linear arithmetic, uninterpreted functions, and
arrays. Below, we describe our implementation; we refer to Appendix D in the supplementary
materials for further details.
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Algorithmic Strategy. Our implementation is a determinization of the algorithm presented in § 5.
To ensure that we get tight upper bounds on failure probability, our implementation aggressively
tries to apply the merge rule—recall that the merge rule allows us take the maximum failure
probability across two automata, instead of the sum. Specically, we modify the rule trace to
return a set of traces τ1, . . . ,τn ∈ L(P) ∩ L(A). en, we aempt to simultaneously label all
traces with the same interpolants at nodes pertaining to the same control location. To ensure that
we compute similar interpolants across traces, we use the same distribution axiom for the same
sampling instruction in all traces it appears in. Finally, we aempt to apply the rule generalize to
create cycles in the resulting automaton.
Discovering Axioms. Given a formula of the form ∃f . ∀X .φ, we check its validity using a
propose-and-check loop: (i) we propose an interpretation of f and then (ii) check if ∀X .φ is
valid with that interpretation using the smt solver (more on this below). e rst step proposes
interpretations of f of increasing size, e.g., for a unary function f (x), it would try 0, 1,x ,x + 1, etc.
As we shall see, even for complex randomized algorithms from the literature, the required axioms
are syntactically simple, so this simple strategy works rather well.
Checking Validity. e case studies to follow make heavy use of non-linear arithmetic (e.g., x ·yz +
u > 0) and transcendental functions (namely, log). Non-linear theories are generally undecidable.
To work around this fact, we implement an incomplete formula validity checker using an eager
version of the theorem enumeration technique recently proposed by Srikanth et al. (2017). First, we
treat non-linear operations as uninterpreted functions, thus overapproximating their semantics.
Second, we strengthen formulas by instantiating theorems about those non-linear operations. For
instance, the following theorem relates division and multiplication: ∀x ,y.y > 0⇒ x ·yy = x . We
then instantiate x and y with terms over variables in the formula. Since there are innitely many
possible instantiations of x andy, we restrict instantiations to terms of size 1, i.e., variables/constants.
Our implementation uses a xed set of theorems about multiplication, division, and logarithms.
ese are instantiated for every given formula, typically resulting in ∼1000 additional conjuncts.
Interpolation Technique. Given the richness of the theories we use, we found that existing
proof-based interpolation techniques either do not support the theories we require (e.g., the Math-
SAT solver (Cimai et al. 2013)) or fail to nd generalizable interpolants, e.g., cannot discover
quantied interpolants (e.g., Z3). As such, we implement a template-guided interpolation tech-
nique (Albarghouthi and McMillan 2013; Rummer and Subotic 2013), where we force interpolants
to follow syntactic forms that appear in the program. Specically, for every Boolean predicate φ
appearing in the program, the specication, or the axioms, we create a template φt by replacing
its variables with placeholders, denoted  i . For instance, given x > y, we generate the template
 1 >  2.
Given a set of templates, our interpolation technique searches for an interpolant as a conjunction
of instantiations of those templates, where each placeholder can be replaced by a well-typed term
over formula variables. Given the innite set of possible instantiations, our implementation xes
the size of possible instantiations (e.g., to size 1), and proceeds by nding the smallest possible
interpolants in terms of number of conjuncts. If it cannot, it expands the search to terms of larger
sizes.
7.2 Case Studies in Privacy-Preserving Algorithms
Dierential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006) is a strong probabilistic property modeling statistical data
privacy. Informally, a randomized database query satises dierential privacy if adding/removing a
single individual’s private data to/from the database does not change the output distribution very
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Table 3. Results on private algs. PA: # of proposed axioms; TI: # of theorem instantiations; time is in sec.
Algorithm Axiom(s) synthesized PA TI Time
randResp priv ⇐⇒ snd(r ) 162 0 2
noisySum |Q |/p 5 5496 98
noisyMax |Q |/p 4 1768 33
expMech |R |/p 3 1768 27
aboveT 2/p and 2|Q |/p 22 752 23
sparseVec 3/p, 3|Q |/p, and 3/p 941 1330 97
much, so that dierentially private algorithms reveal lile about any single individual’s record. To
achieve this property, algorithms add random noise at key points in the computation. Sophisticated
dierentially private algorithms are known for a wide variety of common data analyses, and
dierential privacy is starting to see deployments in both industry (Erlingsson et al. 2014; Johnson
et al. 2018) and government (Abowd and Schmue 2017; Haney et al. 2017).
Intuitively, more random noise yields stronger privacy guarantees at the expense of accuracy—the
noisy answers may be too far from the exact answers to be of any practical use. erefore, the
designer of a dierentially private algorithm aims to maximize accuracy of the computed results
while achieving some target level of privacy. We now consider a number of algorithms from the
dierential privacy literature and demonstrate our technique’s ability to automatically prove their
accuracy guarantees. e algorithms and their specications are shown in Fig. 10 and described
below; Table 3 provides runtime and other statistics, which we discuss later in this section.
Randomized Response (randResp). One of the oldest randomized schemes for protecting privacy
is randomized response, proposed by Warner (1965) decades before the formulation of dierential
privacy. In the typical seing, an individual has a single bit (0 or 1) as their private data, representing
e.g. the presence of some disease or genetic marker. Under randomized response, the individual ips
two fair coins: if the rst result is heads, the individual reports their bit honestly, otherwise they
ignore their private bit and report the result of the second ip. In this way, randomized response
guarantees a degree of privacy by introducing plausible deniability—an individual’s reported bit
could have been the result of chance. At the same time, randomized response guarantees a weak
notion of accuracy, as the output is biased towards the true private bit with probability 3/4.
We encode randomized response as the rst program in Fig. 10 and prove the accuracy guarantee.
In the code, priv is the individual’s private bit. e program draws two bits uniformly and then
decides what to return; fst and snd extract the results of the rst and second bits, respectively. e
accuracy guarantee states that the returned answer is equal to the true private bit, except with
probability at most 1/4. Our implementation synthesizes the axiom priv ⇐⇒ snd(r ); this ensures
that the second bit has the same value as priv, so if the rst bit is 0 and the else branch is taken, the
algorithm is forced to return the right result, with a failure probability of 1/4.
Noisy Sum (noisySum). Our next algorithm computes the sum of a set of numeric queries, adding
noise to the answer of each query in order to ensure dierential privacy. is is a simplied version
of the private counters by Chan et al. (2011) and Dwork et al. (2010), which are used to publish
aggregate statistics privately, e.g., total number of website visitors.
e noisySum program takes three inputs: a setQ of integer-valued queries, a database d holding
the private data, and a parameter ε ∈ R representing the desired level of privacy.5 e program
populates an integer array a with answers to each query, with noise drawn from the Laplace
5We encode Q as an integer array where index i holds the result of Qi (d ).
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distribution with scale controlled by ε ; smaller ε is more private, but requires more noise. Finally,
the output is the sum of all noisy answers.
e accuracy guarantee bounds how far the noisy sum deviates from the true sum with fail-
ure probability p, where p is a parameter. Our implementation synthesizes an axiom for each
Laplace sampling, seing the failure probability to be p/|Q | each time. erefore, at step i ,
|ai − Qi (d)| 6 1ε log(|Q |/p). Since there are |Q | iterations, aer the loop exits we have |s −∑ |Q |
j Q j (d)| 6 |Q |ε log(|Q |/p) with a failure probability of at most |Q | · p|Q | = p.
Report Noisy Max (noisyMax) and the Exponential Mechanism (expMech). Our next pair of
algorithms select an approximate maximum element from a set of private data.
In Report Noisy Max (Dwork and Roth 2014), noisyMax in Fig. 10, the algorithm is presented
with a set Q of integer queries, a private database d , and a privacy level ε . e algorithm then
evaluates each query on d and adds Laplace random noise to protect privacy. Finally, the index of
the query with the largest noisy value is returned. For example, if each query counts the number
of patients with a certain disease, then Report Noisy Max will report a disease that may not be true
most prevalent disease, but whose count is not too far from the true maximum count.
e postcondition states that the answer of the returned queryQb is not too far below the answer
of the actual maximum query. To achieve failure probability p, our implementation synthesizes an
axiom for the Laplace sampling statement with failure probability p/|Q |. Since the loop executes
|Q | times, we establish that the postcondition holds with probability p. To do so, the interpolation
engine discovers a number of key facts; we outline two of them:
∀j ∈ [1, i). |aj −Q j (d)| 6 2
ε
log |Q |
p
and ∀j ∈ [1, i). ab > aj
e rst formula species that, for every element of j of a, its distance from the corresponding
valuation of Q j (d) is bounded above by 2/ε log |Q |/p—this follows directly from the choice of
distribution axiom. e second formula states that the best element is indeed larger than all
previously seen ones. Upon loop exit, these facts, along with others, are sucient to imply
the postcondition. Notice that the 2/ε log |Q |/p in the rst formula weakens to 4/ε log |Q |/p in
the postcondition. is is due to the two-sided error introduced by the absolute value in the
Laplace axiom. e proof computed for noisyMax is presented in detail in Appendix D.1 in the
supplementary materials.
e algorithm expMech is a discrete version of the seminal Exponential mechanism (McSherry
and Talwar 2007), a fundamental algorithm in dierential privacy. is algorithm is used to achieve
dierentially privacy in non-numerical queries, as well as a mechanism for achieving certain notions
of fairness in decision-making algorithms (Dwork et al. 2012). expMech takes a set R of possible
output elements, a utility function u mapping each element of R and private database to a numeric
score, a private database d , and privacy parameter ε . e algorithm aims to return an element of R
that has large utility on the given database. expMech diers from noisyMax through the use of
the exponential distribution; because the exponential distribution never produces results lower
than the shi, the accuracy bound for the expMech is beer. e distance to the true maximum is
at most 2ε log(2|R |/p) instead of 4ε log(|Q |/p), with failure probability at most p. To prove this, our
implementation synthesizes an axiom analogous to that used for noisyMax.
Abovereshold (aboveT) and the SparseVectorMechanism (sparseVec). A useful dierential
privacy primitive is to return the rst query in a list with a numeric answer (approximately) above
some given threshold, ignoring queries with small answers. Our nal two privacy examples do just
this. e Above reshold algorithm (Dwork and Roth 2014) takes a list Q of queries, a private
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
1:24 Calvin Smith, Justin Hsu, and Aws Albarghouthi
database d , a numeric threshold T , and the target privacy level ε . First, the program computes a
noisy threshold t by adding noise to the true threshold T . e program loops through the queries,
comparing the noisy answer of each query to the noisy threshold. If the noisy answer is above the
noisy threshold, the program sets the ag done and exits the loop. Finally, the algorithm returns the
index of the approximately above threshold query, or a default value ⊥ if no such query was found.
e accuracy guarantee requires some care. ere are two cases: the returned value is either
a query index, or ⊥. In the rst case, qans should have true value not too far below the exact
threshold T , and all prior queries should have true value not too far above T . In the second case,
no query was found to be above threshold aer adding noise, so no true answer should be too far
above T . To prove this property, we synthesize axioms for the Laplace sampling instructions with
dierent failure probabilities: p2 for the threshold sampling, and
p
2 |Q | for each loop sampling. ere
is one threshold sampling and at most |Q | loop iterations, so the total failure probability is at most
p
2 + |Q | · p2 |Q | = p.
A slightly more involved variant of this algorithm, called Numeric Sparse Vector (Dwork and
Roth 2014), also returns a noisy answer to the above threshold query along with the query’s index.
Again, the accuracy property describes the two cases—above threshold query found, and no above
threshold queries. In both cases, the noisy query answer should be close to the true answer. e
proof proceeds much like in the simpler variant, adjusting the failure probabilities when applying
axioms in order to take the additional noisy answer sampling into account.
Discussion of Results. Table 3 summarizes the results of applying our implementation to the
above algorithms. e table lists the synthesized axiom per sampling statement—recall that our
implementation strategy forces dierent instances of a sampling statement to use the same axiom.
Additionally, we list the number of proposed and checked axioms (PA),6 the largest number of
theorem instantiations for dealing with non-linear arithmetic (TI), and the total time in seconds.
Consider the aboveT algorithm. e implementation aempts 22 dierent pairs (because there
are two sampling statements) of axioms. Table 3 lists the synthesized interpretation of the function
f (V in) for the rst and second sampling statements. e implementation discovers the axiom
that assigns a failure probability p/2 for the rst sampling statement and p/(2|Q |) for the second
sampling statement. Proving accuracy of aboveT takes 23 seconds and 752 theorems are instantiated
to interpret non-linear arithmetic. Notice that noisySum takes the longest amount of time, even
though it only aempts 5 axioms. is is due to the large number (∼5500) of theorem instantiations.
For sparseVec, the implementation proposes 941 axioms before discovering the shown axioms.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing tools can automatically reason about the algorithms
and accuracy properties we have discussed here. e algorithms we considered are small yet
sophisticated. As the number of sampling statements increases, the space of possible axioms grows
combinatorially, impacting synthesis performance. As research into constraint-based program
synthesis progresses, our approach can directly benet from these developments.
7.3 Case Study in Unreliable Hardware
To demonstrate our approach’s versatility, we consider another possible application: analyzing
programs executing on approximate hardware, which is unreliable but ecient.
We use the program searchRef from the Rely system by Carbin et al. (2013), shown in Fig. 11,
which implements a pixel-block search algorithm from x264 video encoders. e program receives
a constant number of pixel blocks (nblocks = 20) of size 16 × 16 (height × width).
6PA does not include the many possible axiom instantiations that are not well-typed.
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nblocks, height,width← 20, 16, 16
fun searchRef(pblocks, cblock)
reliable: i, j,k
unreliable: minssd,minblock, ssd, t , t1, t2
i ← 0
while i < nblocks do
ssd, j ← 0, 0
while j < height do
k ← 0
while k < width do
t1, t2 ← pblocks[i, j], cblock[j]
t ← t1 Û− t2
ssd ← ssd Û+ (t Û× t)
k ← k + 1
j ← j + 1
if sdd Û< minssd then
minssd,minblock ← ssd, i
i ← i + 1
return minblock
Fig. 11. Reliability ex. (Carbin et al. 2013)
is program is expected to provide adequate
video encoding despite potential hardware fail-
ures. Rely’s programming model exposes un-
reliable arithmetic operations, denoted with a
dot (e.g. Û+, Û−, etc.), which may fail with small
probability (say, 10−7). Reading from variables
typed as unreliable may also fail with a small
probability. Rely assumes loops over unreliable
data have a constant bound on the number of
iterations, so these loops can be unrolled.
Our goal is to prove the probability of a reli-
able execution is at least 0.99, where reliability
implies no failures along the execution.7 To
do so, we analyze a version of the program in-
strumented with a Boolean ag unrel, which
is initialized to false. We model each unreli-
able operation by adding a sampling from the
Bernoulli distribution to determine whether the
operation fails. For instance, a read y ← x
from an unreliable x is transformed into y ←
x ; unrel← unrel∨bern(10−7). We then use our
implementation to prove `0.01 {true} searchRef {unrel = false}.
Unlike Rely, we do not assume independent failures. Our analysis thus gives a more conservative
estimate of failure probability, but, as a benet, retains soundness even if failures are correlated.
Nevertheless, we are able to prove that the program is reliable with probability > 0.992832,
compared to the 0.994885 computed by Rely. Moreover, since our approach is symbolic, we can
prove a symbolic reliability bound as a function of the number of blocks and their size. is allows
us to ask: how many blocks can we use, and how large, and still be reliable? We automatically
establish the parameterized failure probability 1.4 · 10−6 · nblocks · height · width, describing how
program parameters aect reliability. For instance, we can increase the number of blocks to 25
and still maintain > 0.99 reliability, or quadruple the size of each block to 322 pixels and get > .97
reliability. In both seings, our approach completes the proof in less than 2 seconds.
8 RELATEDWORK
Interpolation & Trace Abstraction. In soware verication, interpolants were rst used for con-
structing predicate abstract domains in counterexample-guided abstraction renement (cegar). (Hen-
zinger et al. 2004). McMillan’s work on lazy abstraction with interpolants (McMillan 2006) used
proofs of correctness of program traces to directly construct Hoare-style annotations. By unrolling
the program’s cfg into a tree and adding annotations, he showed how to generalize a tree of paths
into an automaton by adding back edges, proving the correctness of innitely many traces.
Our approach is inspired by work by Heizmann et al. (2009, 2010, 2013), which provided an
insightful and general view of interpolation-based verication through the lens of automata.
Elegance aside, the automata view beer suits our probabilistic seing: in McMillan’s original
formulation, a program can be unrolled into a tree, as paths with common prexes can be combined.
7Rely multiplies this probability by the reliability of the inputs (pblocks, cblock)—this does not impact the analysis.
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In our seing this combining is more subtle—our ! is a restricted version. Further, the automata
view allows us to maintain sets of traces separately and sum up their probabilities of failure.
Deductive Probabilistic Verication. Deductive verication techniques for probabilistic pro-
grams include probabilistic Hoare logics (Barthe et al. 2018; Chadha et al. 2007; den Hartog 2002;
Rand and Zdancewic 2015). and the lightweight probabilistic logic of Barthe et al. (2016b) our
technique is closely related to, just as the classical interpolation-based techniques mirror Hoare-
style proofs. Deductive techniques are highly expressive, but the complex proofs typically must be
constructed manually or in an interactive seing. In contrast, our approach has the advantage of
automation.
Pre-Expectation Calculus. e pre-expectation calculus and associated predicate transformers
(Kozen 1985; Morgan et al. 1996) can prove properties of probabilistic programs, but have practical
obstacles to full automation. Computing pre-expectations across sampling instructions yields an
integral over the distribution being sampled from. Complex distributions, like the innite-support
Laplace distribution, yield correspondingly complex integrals that are dicult to reason about.
Any automation of the pre-expectation calculus will need to establish algebraic properties about
these mathematical expressions. Our use of distribution axioms (§ 6) obviates the need to reason
directly about integrals via a reduction to synthesis.
Martingales. Martingales—probabilistic analogues of loop invariants—are used in automated
tools to prove termination conditions (Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan 2013; Chaerjee et al.
2016a,b, 2017; McIver et al. 2018) and properties of expected values (Barthe et al. 2016a). Automated
martingale synthesis techniques are restricted to linear or polynomial invariants, which alone are
unable to prove the accuracy properties we are interested in.
Probabilistic Model Checking. Probabilistic model checking is perhaps the most well-developed
technique for automated reasoning about probabilistic systems. Traditionally, it focused on temporal
properties of Markov Decision Processes (mdp)—surveys by Kwiatkowska et al. (2010) and Katoen
(2016) overview the current state of the art.
Our program model can be cast as an innite-state mdp, with non-determinism at program entry
to pick an initial state. ere have been a number of abstraction-based techniques for reducing the
size of large (or innite) mdps (Hermanns et al. 2008; Kaenbelt et al. 2009, 2010). To our knowledge,
existing works cannot handle the programs and properties we consider here. e general limitation
is the inability of existing model checking techniques to handle distribution expressions—e.g., a
Laplace whose scale is a parameter—and failure probabilities that are expressions. Probabilistic
cegar (Hermanns et al. 2008) uses a guarded-command language where probabilistic choice is
a real-value determining the probability of executing each command. Other techniques limit
distribution expressions to nite distributions with constant parameters (Kaenbelt et al. 2009).
Teige and Fra¨nzle (2011) consider interpolation in stochastic Boolean satisability (Liman et al.
2001), where formulas contain existential and probabilistic quantiers. e approach has been used
for generalizing bounded encodings of nite-state mdps, in an analogous fashion to the original
work on interpolation-based model checking (McMillan 2003).
Other Probabilistic Analyses. Probabilistic abstract interpretation (Cousot and Monerau 2012)
generalizes the abstract interpretation framework to a probabilistic seing; other techniques can be
cast in this framework (Claret et al. 2013; Monniaux 2000, 2001, 2005). Recently, Wang et al. (2018)
presented pmaf, an elegant algebraic framework for constructing analyses of probabilistic programs.
e approach is rather general, accepting recursive programs and supporting interprocedural
analyses. Unlike pmaf, whose results depend highly on the expressiveness of the chosen abstract
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domain, our technique constructs abstractions on demand, a` la interpolation-based verication, at
the risk of never generalizing. pmaf instantiations considered by Wang et al. (2018) cannot prove
our target accuracy properties, but alternative instantiations might achieve something similar.
Another line of work reduces probabilistic verication to a form of counting (Albarghouthi
2017; Belle et al. 2015; Chistikov et al. 2015; Mardziel et al. 2011). To compute the probability
that a formula is sat, these techniques count the number of satisfying assignments—or perform
numerical volume estimation in the innite-state case. While these techniques can compute very
precise—oen exact—probabilities, they target simpler program models. Specically, programs
have no inputs, probability distribution are not parameterized, and loops are handled via unrolling.
Our technique is related to works verifying relational probabilistic properties, including dieren-
tial privacy and uniformity (Albarghouthi and Hsu 2018a,b). ese systems encode the space of
coupling proofs as a constraint-based synthesis problem. Our technique handles dierent properties,
but shares the high-level design principle of reducing probabilistic reasoning to logical reasoning.
Computer algebra and symbolic inference methods (e.g., (Cusumano-Towner et al. 2018; Gehr
et al. 2016; Narayanan et al. 2016)) have been applied to probabilistic programs in dierent domains
(e.g., (Gehr et al. 2018)). While these tools can automatically generate symbolic representations of
output distributions, proving properties about these distributions remains challenging. Modern
implementations use a variety of custom heuristics and reduction strategies to try to simplify
complex algebraic terms, a computationally-expensive task.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have presented a generalization of trace abstraction for proving accuracy properties of proba-
bilistic programs. is required four key ideas: (i) representing probabilistic traces with failure
automata labeled with formulas and probabilities, (ii) merging and generalizing these failure au-
tomata, (iii) axiomatizing distributions by solving a synthesis problem, and (iv) applying Craig
interpolation to construct labels of failure automata. ese ideas enable automated verication of
accuracy properties using logic-based techniques, while handling rich programs and properties.
For future work, we see trace abstraction modulo probability being extended with other kinds of
probabilistic reasoning, perhaps based on independence or expectations; the challenge is keeping the
complexity of the logical encoding under control. Another natural path is to connect to recent work
on probabilistic abstract interpretation, e.g. by Wang et al. (2018). One could imagine enhancing a
standard abstract domain with failure probabilities. However, the treatment of sampling instructions
is unclear—there are typically multiple axioms for a given distribution, and a proof may need several
dierent axiomatizations to prove a target property.
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A OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. By denition of the semantics, the output distribution of a program P on input state s isJPK(s) = ∑
τ ∈L(P )
Jτ K(s).
Hence for any input state s ∈ φpre, we haveJPK(s)(φpost) = ∑
τ ∈L(P )
Jτ K(s)(φpost) 6 ∑
τ ∈L(A)
Jτ K(s)(φpost) 6 s(β)
by the trace inclusion and failure probability upperbound conditions. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof. Let s ∈ φpre be any input state satisfying the pre-condition. For each automaton Ai , the
pre-condition inclusion condition implies that s ∈ φpre ⊆ λi (qini ) and so eorem 4.4 gives∑
τ ∈L(Ai )
Jτ K(s)(λi (qaci )) 6 s(κi (qaci )).
By the post-condition inclusion property, we also have φpost ⊆ λi (qaci ) and so∑
τ ∈L(Ai )
Jτ K(s)(φpost) 6 s(κi (qaci )).
Finally we can conclude by the trace inclusion and failure probability upperbound conditions:
JPK(s)(φpost) = ∑
τ ∈L(P )
Jτ K(s)(φpost) 6 n∑
i=1
∑
τ ∈L(Ai )
Jτ K(s)(φpost) 6 n∑
i=1
s(κi (qaci )) 6 s(β).

A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. We rst consider the simpler case when A has no directed loops. In such an automaton,
the valuation of the deterministic variables V det at any node qi is the same for all execution traces
starting at qin with initial state s0 and reaching qi ; we write vi for these valuations, and we write
vin and vac for these valuations at qin and qac, respectively.
We need to work with a slightly more general version of well-labeled automata, where the initial
and nal nodes are labeled by a function of the deterministic variables V det. We show that for any
initial state s0 ∈ λ(qin), we have∑
τ ∈L(A)
µ(λ(qac)) 6 vac (κ(qac)) −vin(κ(qin)).
where µ = Jτ K(s0) is the output distribution. Note that when κ(qin) = 0 and κ(qac) is labeled by
input variables V in only, we recover:∑
τ ∈L(A)
µ(λ(qac)) 6 s0(κ(qac)).
e proof is by induction on the number k of branches (i.e., nodes with two outgoing e
In the base case k = 0, the automaton represents a sequential composition st1; · · · ; stn . Let the
corresponding nodes be q0, . . . ,qn , with q0 = qin and qn = qac. Since the probability labels λ(qi )
depend on deterministic variables only, given any initial state s0 ∈ κ(q0) there is a sequence of
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
1:32 Calvin Smith, Justin Hsu, and Aws Albarghouthi
valuations v0, . . . ,vn for the deterministic variables such that the deterministic variables V det of
any state with non-zero probability in Jst1; · · · ; stiK(s0) are set to vi , with v0 = s0(V det). By the
well-labeled condition, we have:
`vi (κ(qi ))−vi−1(κ(qi−1)) {λ(qi−1) ∧V det = vi−1} sti {λ(qi ) ∧V det = vi }
By the sequential composition rule of the union bound logic, we have
`vn (κ(qac))−v0(κ(q in)) {λ(qin) ∧V det = v0} st1; · · · ; stn {λ(qac)}
By denition, vn = vac and v0 = vin so we have
`vac (κ(qac))−vin (κ(q in)) {λ(qin) ∧V det = vin} st1; · · · ; stn {λ(qac)}
and we conclude by soundness of the union bound logic.
Now, suppose there are k > 0 branches in A. Starting from the initial node qin, let the rst
branching node be qr with outgoing edges to qt and qf , labeled by assume(b) and assume(¬b)
respectively. We let A0 be the sub-automaton with initial node qin and nal node qr ; note that this
automaton is a single path along nodes q0 = qin,q1, . . . ,qr with edge labels st1, . . . , str . Leing
µr = JA0K(s0) be the output distribution of this automaton, the base case yields∑
τ ∈L(A0)
µr (λ(qr )) 6 vr (κ(qr )) −vin(κ(qin)).
Now, we consider the rest of the automaton. Let At be the sub-automaton of all reachable nodes
starting from qt , and let Af be the sub-automaton starting from qf . Note that At and Af are both
well-labeled automata with entry nodes qt and qf respectively, and have at most k − 1 branching
nodes each. Since the assume statements do not modify this variables, v is also the deterministic
valuation of V det at the entry nodes of qt and qf . By induction, for any state s ∈ λ(qb ) such that
s(V det) = vr and b ∈ {t , f } we have∑
τ ∈L(Ab )
Jτ K(s)(λ(qac)) 6 vac (κ(qac)) −vr (κ(qb ))
To combine our bounds forA0,At ,Af back together, we assume that the state labels at the branching
node qr satisfy
λ(qr ) ⊆ λ(qt ) ∩ {s | s(b)} and λ(qr ) ⊆ λ(qf ) ∩ {s | s(¬b)}.
If either fails, then the edge condition for well-labeled automata ensures that vac (qac) −vr (qr ) >
vr (qb ) −vr (qr ) > 1 and so vac (qac) −vin(qin) > 1, and our target bound is trivial. Now, every trace
in L(A) is of the form q0, . . . ,qr ,qb , . . . ,qac for b = t or b = f ; since A has no loops, the trace aer
qr is entirely contained in Ab .
Now, we decompose µr = µt + µf + µerr into three pieces:
• µerr is the restriction to states not in λ(qr );
• µt is the restriction to states in λ(qr ) with b is true;
• µf is the restriction to states not in λ(qr ) with b false.
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Note that all states in the support of µt and µf lie in λ(qt ) and λ(qf ), respectively. Since A0,At ,Af
are all loop free with at most k − 1 branches, applying the induction hypothesis gives∑
τ ∈L(A)
Jτ K(s0)(λ(qac)) 6 bind(µt , JAt K)(λ(qac)) + bind(µf , JAf K)(λ(qac)) + |µerr | (semantics)
6 |µt | · (vac (κ(qac)) −vr (κ(qt ))) + |µf | · (vac (κ(qac)) −vr (κ(qf )))
+ (vr (κ(qr )) −vin(κ(qin))) (IH)
6 |µt | · (vac (κ(qac)) −vr (κ(qr ))) + |µf | · (vac (κ(qac)) −vr (κ(qr )))
+ (vr (κ(qr )) −vin(κ(qin))) (κ(qr ) 6 κ(qb ))
= (|µt | + |µf |) · vac (κ(qac)) + (1 − |µt | − |µf |) · vr (κ(qr )) −vin(κ(qin))
6 vac (κ(qac)) −vin(κ(qin)) (κ(qr ) 6 κ(qac))
Finally, we consider the general case where A may have directed loops. e basic idea is to reduce
to the acyclic case we have just considered by performing nite unrollings of A. e argument
uses standard constructions on automata and regular expressions (see, e.g., prior work giving an
algebraic view of program schemes (Angus and Kozen 2001)); we just sketch the proof here. Let C
be the set of all statements appearing in A. We can view A as a deterministic automaton D over
the alphabet Σ = Q ×Q ×C by viewing each transition qi st−→ qj as a transition on leer (qi ,qj , st).
To make this a deterministic automaton, we can add a new dead node qdead with a self loop on all
leers, and add a transition from every existing node q ∈ Q to qdead on all leers that don’t appear
as outgoing transitions from q in A. en, we mark qac as the sole accepting node in D. Now, the
language LD accepted by D is evidently equal to the language L(A) of all traces in A.
By Kleene’s theorem, this language can also be represented as a regular expression R over Σ.
Now, we can dene nite unrollings in terms of R. For n ∈ N, let Rn be the regular expression
obtained by repeatedly replacing each subterm r ∗ where r is star-free by the nite approximation
1 + r + · · · + rn ; the order of replacement will not maer for our purposes. Now L(R) = ∪nL(Rn),
and L(Ri ) ⊆ L(R j ) for all i 6 j . Again by Kleene’s theorem, the language of each Rn is recognized
by a deterministic nite automaton; let Dn be a minimal automaton for each Rn .
Now since the language of Rn is nite and Dn is minimal, the only cycles in Dn must occur
as self-loops on a single (non-accepting) dead node pn . All transitions from the initial node to
non-dead nodes must be labeled by (qin,−,−). ere are at most two such transitions since there
are at most two transitions out of qin in the original automaton A, and if there are two transitions
they must be of the form (qin,qt , assume(b)) and (qin,qf , assume(¬b)). By a similar inductive
argument, each non-dead node has at most two outgoing transitions to non-dead nodes and if
there are two transitions, they are of the form (q,qt , assume(b)) and (q,qf , assume(¬b)). us, we
can associate each node p in Dn with a node a(p) in A and convert Dn to a well-labeled acyclic
automaton An by labeling λ(p) , λ(a(p)) and κ(p) , κ(a(p)) and removing the dead node; note
that L(An) = L(Dn) = L(Rn).
Finally, let s be any initial state in λ(qin). By reduction to the acyclic case, we have∑
τ ∈L(An )
Jτ K(s)(λ(qac)) 6 s(κ(qac))
for every n ∈ N. Since the le-hand side is increasing in n and bounded above by s(κ(qac)), the
limit exists and we have
lim
n→∞
∑
τ ∈L(An )
Jτ K(s)(λ(qac)) 6 s(κ(qac)).
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But since L(An) is increasing and ∪nL(An) = L(A), we conclude∑
τ ∈L(A)
Jτ K(s)(λ(qac)) 6 s(κ(qac)).

A.4 Proof of Theorem 5.5
Proof. We show by induction on the derivation of rules used by the algorithm that the automaton
setA is always well-labeled, and each automaton inA satises the pre- and post-condition inclusion
properties in eorem 4.5. e base case, rule init, is trivial. Each trace added to the automaton set
by trace is well-labeled by construction, and the simplication rules generalize and merge keep
the automaton set well-labeled by denition (eorem 5.4). Finally, if the termination rule correct
res, then the automata are well-labeled and satisfy pre- and post-condition inclusion properties by
induction, and the side-conditions guarantee the trace inclusion and failure probability upperbound
conditions. erefore by eorem 4.5, the accuracy judgment is valid. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 6.4
We rst begin by proving the following lemma, which captures correctness of the encoding of τ .
Specically, the following lemma formalizes the correspondence between models of the encoding
and the support of the output distribution of τ : we show that for any initial state s , the models of the
logical encoding correspond to a set of states Rs and a failure probability c such that Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6 c .
Lemma A.1 (Soundness of enc). Fix trace τ = st1; · · · ; stn . Let
φ , ω0 = 0 ∧ h0 = false ∧
n∧
i=1
enc(i, sti )
where all uninterpreted functions resulting from distribution axiom families have been given a xed
interpretation. Fix a state s ∈ S . Let M1, . . . ,Mm be the set of models of φ such that s(V in) = Mi (V in)
and Mi (hn) = false, for all i ∈ [1,m]. Let
Rs = {s ′ | s ′(V ) = Mi (V )}
en, for any Ms |= φ such that Ms (V in) = s(V in), we have Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6 Ms (ωn).
Proof. First, we note that all models Ms |= φ such that Ms (V in) = s(V in) agree on the value of
ωi . is is because the constraints ωi are functions of V in. Second, note that by construction, there
is always Ms |= φ—i.e., it is never unsatisable.
We proceed by induction on the length of τ . For n = 1, we have three cases. Fix an s as in lemma
statement.
• Case 1: τ = v ← e.
We have φ , v = e ∧ ω1 = 0 ∧ h1 = false (aer simplication). From φ, Ms (ω1) = 0.
erefore, lemma states: Jv ← eK(s)(Rs ) 6 0. Suppose this does not hold, then, by denition
of Jv ← eK, there is a state s ′ ∈ S \ Rs such that s ′ = s[v 7→ s(e)]. However, by denition of
φ, s ′ ∈ Rs , since Mi (V ) = s ′(V ), for some i .
• Case 2: τ = assume(b).
We have φ , ω1 = 0 ∧ (h1 = ¬b) (aer simplication). From φ, Ms (ω1) = 0. erefore,
lemma states: Jassume(b)K(s)(Rs ) 6 0. Suppose this does not hold, then, by denition ofJassume(b)K, we have s ∈ S \ Rs and s(b) = true. However, by denition of φ, s ∈ Rs , i
s(b) = true.
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• Case 3: τ = v ∼ d.
We have φ , ω1 = eub ∧ h1 = φax (aer simplication). Lemma states that Jv ∼
dK(s)(Rs ) 6 Ms (eub). is follows from the denition of a distribution axiom: that
Prv∼d[φax] 6 eub is true for any valuation of V \ {v}.
Assume that lemma holds for traces of length n. We show that it also holds for n + 1, where τ ′ is
a trace of length n.
• Case 1: τ = τ ′;v ← e.
e encoding is φ , φ ′ ∧v = e ∧ ωn+1 = ωn ∧ hn+1 = hn .
Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′m and R′s be dened for φ ′ and τ ′, as per lemma statement. By hypothesis,Jτ ′K(s)(R′s ) 6 Ms (ωn). By semantics of assignment, we have Jτ ′;v ← eK(s)(X ) 6 Ms (ωn+1),
where X = {s | s ′ ∈ R′s , s = s ′[v ← s ′(e)]}. Observe that X = Rs : by denition of φ, its
models are a subset of {M ′1, . . . ,M ′m} such that v = e. It then follows that Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6
Ms (ωn+1).
• Case 2: τ = τ ′; assume(b).
e encoding is φ , φ ′ ∧ ωn = ωn−1 ∧ (hn = (hn−1 ∨ ¬b)). Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′m and R′s be
dened for φ ′ and τ ′, as per lemma statement. By hypothesis, Jτ ′K(s)(R′s ) 6 Ms (ωn). We
know that models {Mi } of φ are a subset of {M ′i } where b is true. erefore Rs ⊇ R′s . But
we have that all states in Rs \ R′s are those were b is false. By denition of Jassume(b)K, all
those states are assigned probability 0. erefore, Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6 Ms (ωn+1).
• Case 3: τ = τ ′;v ∼ d.
e encoding is φ , φ ′ ∧ ωn+1 = ωn + eub ∧ hn+1 = (hn ∨ φax). Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′m and R′s
be dened for φ ′ and τ ′, as per lemma statement. By hypothesis, Jτ ′K(s)(R′s ) 6 Ms (ωn). Let
X be the set of all states that satisfy ¬φax. From φ, we know that Rs = R′s ∩X . By the union
bound and the distribution axiom, Jτ ′;v ∼ dK(s)(R′s ∪ X ) 6 Ms (ωn+1)

Now, correctness of eorem 6.4 follows from eorem A.1.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6.3
Proof. Soundness of the Bernoulli and Uniform axioms is straightforward. e Laplace axiom is
Barthe et al. (2016b, Lemma 5). e exponential axiom follows from the Laplace axiom, noting that
s(exp(v1,v2))(z) 6 2 · s(lap(v1,v2))(z)
for all z > s(v1), so the failure probability for the exponential axiom is at most twice the failure
probability for the Laplace axiom. 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6.7
Proof. Notice that by construction we have λ(qin) , true and κ(qin) = 0.
We rst show that λ(qac) ⇒ φpost. By construction of encoding: ∧ni=1 φi ⇒ (¬hn ⇒ φpost) is
valid. By denition of sequence interpolants: ψn ⇒ (¬hn ⇒ φpost) is valid. erefore ψn[hn 7→
false] ⇒ φpost is valid. Since ωn does not appear in φpost, ∃ωn .ψn[hn 7→ false] ⇒ φpost is valid.
Second, we show that φpre ⇒ κ(qac) 6 β . By construction, κ(qac) , f (V in), where f (V in)
is the function that returns, for any valuation of V in, the largest value of ωn that satises ∃V \
V in. ∃hn .ψn . By denition of sequence interpolants: ψn ⇒ ωn 6 β . Since β is over V in, we
have ∃V \ V in. ∃hn .ψn ⇒ ωn 6 β is valid. Pick a model M of φpre with the largest possible ωn
interpretation that satises ∃V \V in. ∃hn .ψn . By construction of the encoding this model exists,
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
1:36 Calvin Smith, Justin Hsu, and Aws Albarghouthi
since any model satisfying φpre can be extended to a model of
∧
i φi . It follows that this model
satises ωn 6 β .
Finally, we need to show that for every edge qi
st−→ qj , where j = i + 1, we have
`wpf (κ(qj ),st)−κ(qi ) {λ(qi )} st {λ(qj )}
We break the proof by statement type:
• Assignment: From denition of seq. interpolants, we know the following is valid
ψi ∧v = e ∧ ωj = ωi ∧ hj = hi ⇒ ψj
Set hi to false on le-hand side of implication. e following is valid:
ψi [hi 7→ false] ∧v = e ∧ ωj = ωi ∧ hj = false⇒ ψj
It follows that we can set hj to false on both sides, resulting in the following valid statement:
ψi [hi 7→ false] ∧v = e ∧ ωj = ωi ⇒ ψj [hj 7→ false]
Weaken rhs by existentially quantifying ωj . e following is valid:
ψi [hi 7→ false] ∧v = e ∧ ωj = ωi ⇒ ∃ωj .ψj [hj 7→ false]
Since ωi is, by encoding, a function of V in, we can project it out on the lhs. e following
is valid:
(∃ωi .ψi [hi 7→ false]) ∧v = e ∧ ωj = ωi ⇒ ∃ωj .ψj [hj 7→ false]
As a result, we can drop the ωj = ωi constraint, resulting in the following valid statement:
(∃ωi .ψi [hi 7→ false]) ∧v = e⇒ ∃ωj .ψj [hj 7→ false]
is implies that the following Hoare triple, since λ(qi ) ≡ ∃ωi .ψi [hi 7→ false] and λ(qj ) ≡
∃ωj .ψj [hj 7→ false]:
`c {λ(qi )} st {λ(qj )}
for any c ∈ [0, 1].
It now remains to show that wpf(κ(qj ), st) − κ(qi ) > 0, for any state s in λ(qi ). From
our constraint, for any values of ωi and V det that satisfy ∃V \ V det. ∃hi .ψi , the same
values where ωj = ωi also satisfy ∃V \V det. ∃hj .ψj . erefore, it is always the case that
wpf(κ(qj ), st) − κ(qi ) > 0
• Sample: Following a similar simplication path to the one we used for assignment state-
ments, we arrive at the following valid statement:
(∃ωi .ψi [hi 7→ false]) ∧ ¬φax ⇒ ∃ωj .ψj [hj 7→ false]
Since we know that Pr[φax] 6 eub, from the applied axiom, this implies that the following
Hoare triple, since λ(qi ) ≡ ∃ωi .ψi [hi 7→ false] and λ(qj ) ≡ ∃ωj .ψj [hj 7→ false]:
`eub {λ(qi )} st {λ(qj )}
It now remains to show that wpf(κ(qj ), st) − κ(qi ) > eub, for any state s in λ(qi ).
Following argument from base case of eorem A.1, we establish the specication. From
our constraint, for any values of ωi andV det that satisfy ∃V \V det. ∃hi .ψi , the same values
where ωj = ωi + eub also satisfy ∃V \ V det. ∃hj .ψj . erefore, it is always the case that
wpf(κ(qj ), st) − κ(qi ) > eub
• Assume: Similar to sampling statements.

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enc(i,v ← e) , v = e ∧ ωi = ωi−1
enc(i, assume(b)) , b ∧ ωi = ωi−1
enc(i,v ∼ d) , ¬φax ∧ ωi = ωi−1 + eub given axiom family: Prv∼d[φax] 6 eub
Fig. 12. Simplified logical encoding of statement semantics for feasible traces
B A SIMPLIFIED ENCODING
e encoding in § 6 is designed for full generality: it assumes that a trace may be infeasible, which is
why it introduces the auxiliary variables hi to track states that cannot make it through the trace. In
the case where the trace is feasible for some input states, the encoding and interpolation problems
become much simpler by doing away with the auxiliary hi variables. e simplied version of enc
is shown in Fig. 12.
Henceforth we assume that for a trace τ , all Boolean expressions appearing in assume statements
are over V det. Second, we assume that there is a state s such that τ (s) is a distribution.
TheoremB.1 (Soundness of simplified encoding). e specication `β {φpre} st1, . . . , stn {φpost}
is valid if the following formula is satisable:
∀V ,ωi .
(
φpre ∧ ω0 = 0 ∧
n∧
i=1
enc(i, sti )
)
=⇒ (ωn 6 β ∧ φpost) (3)
eorem B.1 follows from the next lemma:
Lemma B.2 (Soundness of simplified enc). Fix trace τ = st1; · · · ; stn . Let φ , ω0 = 0 ∧∧n
i=1 enc(i, sti ), where all uninterpreted functions resulting from distribution axiom families have been
given a xed interpretation. Fix a state s ∈ S . Let M1, . . . ,Mm be the set of models of φ such that
s(V in) = Mi (V in), for all i ∈ [1,m]. Let
Rs = {s ′ | s ′(V ) = Mi (V )}
en, for any Mi , we have Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6 Mi (ωn).
Proof. First, we note that all models Mi |= φ agree on the value of ωi . is is because the
constraints ωi are functions of V in. Second, note that by our assumption, there is always Mi |= φ—
i.e., it is never unsatisable.
We proceed by induction on the length of τ . For n = 1, we have three cases. Fix an s as in lemma
statement.
• Case 1: τ = v ← e.
We have φ , v = e ∧ ω1 = 0. From φ, Mi (ω1) = 0, for all i . erefore, lemma states:Jv ← eK(s)(Rs ) 6 0. Suppose this does not hold, then, by denition of Jv ← eK, there is
a state s ′ ∈ S \ Rs such that s ′ = s[v 7→ s(e)]. However, by denition of φ, s ′ ∈ Rs , since
Mi (V ) = s ′(V ), for some i .
• Case 2: τ = assume(b).
We have φ , b ∧ ω1 = 0. From φ, Mi (ω1) = 0, for all i . erefore, lemma states:Jassume(b)K(s)(Rs ) 6 0. Suppose this does not hold, then, by denition of Jassume(b)K,
we have s ∈ S \ Rs and s(b) = true. However, by denition of φ, s ∈ Rs , i s(b) = true.
• Case 3: τ = v ∼ d.
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We have φ , ¬φax ∧ ω1 = eub. Lemma states that Jv ∼ dK(s)(Rs ) 6 Mi (eub), for all i .
is follows from the denition of a distribution axiom: that Prv∼d[φax] 6 eub is true for
any valuation of V \ {v}.
Assume that lemma holds for traces of length n. We show that it also holds for n + 1, where τ ′ is
a trace of length n.
• Case 1: τ = τ ′;v ← e.
e encoding is φ , φ ′ ∧v = e ∧ ωn+1 = ωn .
Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′m and R′s be dened for φ ′ and τ ′, as per lemma statement. By hypothesis,Jτ ′K(s)(R′s ) 6 M ′i (ωn). By semantics of assignment, we have Jτ ′;v ← eK(s)(X ) 6 M ′i (ωn+1),
where X = {s | s ′ ∈ R′s , s = s ′[v ← s ′(e)]}. Observe that X = Rs : by denition of φ, its
models are a subset of {M ′1, . . . ,M ′m} such that v = e. It then follows that Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6
Mi (ωn+1), for all i .
• Case 2: τ = τ ′; assume(b).
e encoding is φ , φ ′ ∧ b ∧ ωn = ωn−1. Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′m and R′s be dened for φ ′ and
τ ′, as per lemma statement. By hypothesis, Jτ ′K(s)(R′s ) 6 M ′i (ωn), for all i . We know that
models {Mi } of φ are a subset of {M ′i } where b is true. erefore Rs ⊇ R′s . But we have
that all states in Rs \ R′s are those were b is false. By denition of Jassume(b)K, all those
states are assigned probability 0. erefore, Jτ K(s)(Rs ) 6 Mi (ωn+1), for all i .
• Case 3: τ = τ ′;v ∼ d.
e encoding is φ , φ ′ ∧ ¬φax ∧ ωn+1 = ωn + eub. Let M ′1, . . . ,M ′m and R′s be dened
for φ ′ and τ ′, as per lemma statement. By hypothesis, Jτ ′K(s)(R′s ) 6 M ′i (ωn), for all i . Let X
be the set of all states that satisfy ¬φax. From φ, we know that Rs = R′s ∩ X . By the union
bound and the distribution axiom, Jτ ′;v ∼ dK(s)(R′s ∪ X ) 6 Mi (ωn+1), for all i .

Assume we construct a sequence of interpolants for the above encoding as described in § 6. en,
the following theorem holds, which is the same as eorem 6.7, but without handling hi variables.
Theorem B.3 (Well-labelings from interpolants). Let {ψi }i be the interpolants computed as
shown above. LetAτ = 〈Q,δ , λ,κ〉 be the failure automaton that accepts only the trace τ = st1, . . . , stn ,
i.e., δ = {qin st1−→ q1,q1 st2−→ q2, . . .qn−1 stn−→ qac}. Set the labeling functions as follows:
(1) λ(qin) , φpre and κ(qin) , 0.
(2) λ(qi ) , ∃ωi .ψi and λ(qac) , ∃ωn .ψn .
(3) κ(qi ) , f (V det), where f (V det) is the function that returns, for any valuation of V det, the
largest value of ωi that satises ∃V \V det.ψi . For κ(qac), we use ∃V \V in.ψn .
en, Aτ is well-labeled and implies `β {φpre} τ {φpost}.
Proof. Similar to eorem 6.7. 
C CAPTURING THE UNION BOUND LOGIC
Our trace abstraction technique is inspired by the union bound logic (ahl), proposed by Barthe
et al. (2016b). e core rules of this program logic are presented in Fig. 13; the only omied rules
are the ones for the skip command (trivial to add to our language) and the rules for external
and internal procedure calls (we do not consider interprocedural analysis). We comment briey
on a few rules; the others are largely standard. e sampling rule [Rand] encodes distribution
axioms. e most complicated rule is [While]—intuitively, the side-conditions ensure that there
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`0 {Φ[v 7→ e]} v ← e {Φ}
Assn
∀s . s(Φ) =⇒ PrJv∼dK(s)(¬Ψ) 6 s(β)
`β {Φ} v ∼ d {Ψ}
Rand
`β {Φ} P {Ψ} `β ′ {Ψ} P ′ {Θ}
`β+β ′ {Φ} P ; P ′ {Θ}
Seq
`β {Φ ∧ b} P {Ψ} `β {Φ ∧ ¬b} P ′ {Ψ}
`β {Φ} if b then P else P ′ {Ψ}
If
∀s,k . s(Φ ∧ b ∧ ev = k) =⇒ PrJPK(s)(ev > k) = 0
ev : N |= Φ ∧ ev 6 0 =⇒ ¬b `β {Φ ∧ b} P {Φ}
`ρ ·β {Φ ∧ ev 6 ρ} while b do P {Φ ∧ ¬b}
While
|= (Φ′ =⇒ Φ) ∧ (Ψ =⇒ Ψ′) ∧ (β 6 β ′) `β {Φ} P {Ψ}
`β ′ {Φ′} P {Ψ′}
Weak
MV (P) ∩ FV (Φ) = ∅
`0 {Φ} P {Φ}
Frame
`β {Φ} P {Ψ} `β ′ {Φ} P {Ψ′}
`β+β ′ {Φ} P {Ψ ∧ Ψ′}
And
`β {Φ} P {Ψ} `β {Φ′} P {Ψ}
`β {Φ ∨ Φ′} P {Ψ}
Or `1 {Φ} P {⊥}
False
Fig. 13. The union bound logic, core rules (Barthe et al. 2016b)
is a non-increasing integer variant ev whose initial value bounds the maximum number of loop
iterations. e program logic also features an interesting complement of structural rules. Along
with the usual rule of consequence [Weak] and rule of constancy [Frame], the disjunction rule
[Or] combines two pre-conditions (keeping the failure probability unchanged) and the conjunction
rule [And] combines two post-conditions, while summing failure probabilities. Finally, the rule
[False] states that a judgment with failure probability at most 1 can prove any post-condition.
A minor but important dierence between the seing in ahl and our seing is in the treatment
of the failure probability expression β . In ahl, these expressions range over some xed set of logical
variables, which appear only in assertions and not in programs. In our setup, we would model
these variables as input variables V in, which may appear in programs by cannot be modied. We
will assume that input variables V in correspond precisely to the logical variables in ahl.
We will show that our proof technique is complete with respect to the logic ahl, subject to two
restrictions on ahl proofs:
(1) e rule [While] is applied to “for”-loops.8
(2) e rule [Or] is not used.
Both of these restrictions stem from how our approach keeps track of the failure probability.
Roughly speaking, the original ahl can analyze loops where the guard is probabilistic but there
is a deterministic bound on the number of iterations. Since our failure probabilities must be
deterministic along the trace, we cannot directly handle such loops. However, these programs still
have a deterministic bound on the number of iterations and so they can be directly transformed to
be of the following form:
while b do P ≡ i ← 0;while i < ρ do i ← i + 1; if b then P else skip
8is can be slightly generalized to loops with a deterministic variant ev , but we make this restriction to simplify proofs.
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e situation with the rule [Or] is similar. If we have two well-labeled automata modeling the
two proofs in the premise, we would like to combine them into a single automata but this is not
possible—the labels on the edges would need to be of the form assume(Φ) or assume(Φ′), but these
guards to not appear in the program P . While it does not appear possible to eliminate the [Or] rule,
in our experience this rule is quite rarely used. e rule can also be avoided entirely by applying a
program transformation to mark the logical cases:
P ≡ if Φ then P else P
and then applying the standard conditional rule [If].
We will prove completeness in two steps. First, we will show that for any derivable judgment in
ahl, there exists a well-labeled automata modeling the judgment (i.e., satisfying the conditions of
eorem 4.5 for the given pre-condition, post-condition, failure probability, and program). en,
we show that well-labeled automata derived from programs can be found by a run of our algorithm,
given some labeling oracle label.
Before we begin, we x an automata representation of imperative programs once and for all.
Each automaton will have one entry node and one exit node. e rest of the nodes, edge labels,
and transition structure will be constructed inductively given a program P .
• Basic statements st ∈ Σ. Automaton with single edge from entry to exit node labeled by st.
• Sequential composition P ; P ′. Identify the exit node for the automaton from P with the
entry node for the automaton from P ′.
• Conditionals if b then P else P ′. Make new entry node, add directed edges labeled by
assume(b) and assume(¬b) to the entry nodes of automata from P and P ′ respectively, and
then identify the exit nodes of the two automata.
• Loops while b do P . Make new entry node with an assume(b) edge to the entry node of
the automaton for P , and an assume(¬b) edge to a new exit node. From the exit node of P ,
add an edge back to the new entry node labeled assume(b) and an edge to the new exit
node labeled assume(¬b).
We call such automata derived from programs well-structured.
Theorem C.1 (Completeness of well-labeled automata). Let `β {Φ} P {Ψ} be derivable in
the fragment of ahl indicated above. en, there exists a well-structured and well-labeled automaton
A satisfying the conditions of eorem 4.5 for this accuracy specication.
Proof. Let A be the well-structured automaton corresponding to P . We will show that the nodes
of A can each be labeled by a predicate and a failure probability expression, such that the entire
automaton is well-labeled and satises the conditions of eorem 4.5. By induction on the proof
derivation.
[Assn] Label the entry and exit nodes by the pre- and post-condition respectively, with failure
probability 0.
[Rand] Label the entry and exit nodes by the pre- and post-condition respectively, with failure
probability 0 and β .
[Seq] Take the well-labelings for P and P ′ by induction. Label the node at the join point with
invariant Ψ. For each node in the P ′ automaton, add β to the failure probability label.
[If] Take the well-labelings for P and P ′ by induction. We may label the entry nodes Φ ∧ b and
Φ ∧ ¬b while preserving the well-labeling. Label the new entry node by Φ with failure
probability 0, and the new exit node by Ψ with failure probability β .
[While] Let ρ be the loop upper bound and let i be the loop counter. Take the well-labeling of
the body P by induction. By assumption on the structure of the while loop, there is a single
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transition from the body entry node q0 to another node q1, and it is labeled by i ← i + 1.
Furthermore, q0 and q1 are both labeled with failure probability 0. Add the deterministic
expression (i − 1) · β to all failure probability labels except at node q0, and set the failure
probability of q0 to be i · β . Label the new initial node by Φ and failure probability 0, and
the new exit node by Φ ∧ ¬b and failure probability ρ · β .
[Weak] Take the well-labeled automaton by induction.
[Frame] Label all nodes by Φ and failure probability 0.
[And] Take the two well-labelings (κ1, λ1) and (κ2, λ2) by induction. By assumption, both of these
well-labeled automata have the same structure (given by the well-structured automaton
corresponding to P ). Set the new labeling functions to be κ = κ1 ∧ κ2, and λ = λ1 + λ2.
[Or] Not allowed.
[False] Label the entry node by Φ and failure probability 0. Label all other nodes by ⊥ and failure
probability 1.

Theorem C.2 (Completeness of algorithm). Let A be a well-structured and well-labeled au-
tomaton. en, there exists a run of our algorithm in Fig. 7 given some labeling oracle labelA that
produces A along its execution.
Proof. We provide a sketch of the proof. First, our algorithm can recover any loop-free well-
labeled automaton (possibly not well-structured). In a bit more detail, let L(A) be the set of all
paths from entry to exit node; note that this set is nite for loop-free automata. By repeatedly
applying trace, our algorithm can label each of these traces using the well-labeling in A, yielding
a set of well-labeled traces. en by repeatedly applying merge, our algorithm can merge all traces
and recover the automaton A.
Now, suppose that A is well-structured but not loop-free. We can convert A to a loop-free
automaton Al f by simply deleting each back edge from the exit node of each while loop back to
its corresponding entry node; dropping edges evidently keeps the automaton well-labeled. By
the previous argument, our algorithm can generate Al f by repeatedly applying trace and merge.
en, we can apply generalize repeatedly to add the deleted edges, noting that there are at most
nitely many such edges since the originally program has nitely many loops. ese new edges
preserve well-labeling and recover A. 
As an immediate corollary, we have the following completeness result.
Corollary C.3. Let `β {Φ} P {Ψ} be derivable in the fragment of ahl indicated above. en, there
exists a run of our algorithm in Fig. 7 given some labeling oracle labelA terminating successfully with
rule correct.
Proof. By eorem C.1, there exists a well-labeled automaton A proving the specication. By
eorem C.2, there is a run of the algorithm that constructs this automaton. At that point in the
execution, rule correct applies and the algorithm succeeds. 
D IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
is section expands on § 7 by providing additional implementation details and examples.
Algorithmic Strategy. Our implementation is a determinization of the algorithm presented in
§ 5. To ensure that we prove the given specications by computing tight upper bounds on failure
probability, our implementation aggressively tries to apply the merge rule—recall that the merge
rule allows us take the maximum failure probability across two automata, instead of the sum.
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1: A ← ∅
2: i ← 1 . counter
3: while correct does not apply do
4: e following lines implement trace for a set of traces
5: Get all paths τ1, . . . ,τn ∈ L(P) \ L(A) that go through each loop at most i times.
6: For every τj , let Ψj be the encoding in eorem 6.4, where dierent occurrences of the
same sampling statement use the same parameter f (V in) in their distribution axiom.
7: done← false
8: while not done do
9: pick an interpretation M for every f (V in) in {Ψj }j
10: if M |= ∧j Ψj then
11: done← true
12: axioms ← M
13: Compute interpolants for every Ψj where f (V in) are instantiated by axioms and create
well-labeled automata {Aj }j
14: Add {Aj }j to A
15: e following repeatedly applies merge
16: Apply merge to every pair of automata in A until it does not apply any more
17: e following loop repeatedly applies generalize
18: for every Ai ∈ A do
19: for all q,q′ in Ai s.t. q,q′ denote the same loop head in P do
20: Apply generalize to q,q′ with st ∈ Σ being the loop exit condition
21: i ← i + 1
Fig. 14. Implementation of nondeterministic algorithm in Fig. 7
Specically, we modify the rule trace to return a set of traces τ1, . . . ,τn ∈ L(P) ∩ L(A). en,
we aempt to simultaneously label all traces with the same interpolants at nodes pertaining to the
same control location. To ensure that we compute similar interpolants across traces, we aempt
to use the same distribution axiom for the same sampling instruction in all traces it appears in.
Finally, we apply the rule generalize to aempt to create cycles into the resulting automaton.
e pseudocode in Fig. 14 shows our determinization of the algorithm from § 5. e loop at Line 8
goes through axioms as described below, proposing one axiom in every iteration and checking
it. Notice that for every occurrence of a sampling statement, across all traces τj , it aempts the
same axiom—this is used to force a successful merge. Line 13 computes interpolants for every
trace τj ’s encoding Ψj . is procedure also tries to nd the same interpolants for the same control
locations—this ensures success of merge and generalize. In all case studies in § 7, the algorithm
succeeds by considering all traces that execute 0 or 1 iterations of every loop.
Discovering Axioms. Given a formula of the form ∃f . ∀X .φ, we check its validity using a
propose-and-check loop: (i) we propose an interpretation of f and then (ii) check if ∀X .φ is
valid with that interpretation using the smt solver (more on this below). e rst step proposes
interpretations of f of increasing size, e.g., for a unary function f (x), it would try 0, 1,x ,x + 1, etc.
Note that this enumerative approach will encounter many axiom parameters that are not well-
typed or do not satisfy the conditions required for the parameters. For example, for the Laplace
axiom family, we have f (V in) ∈ (0, 1]. erefore, any instantiation that may be real-valued and
6 0 or > 1 is rejected.
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Checking Validity. e case studies we consider make heavy use of non-linear arithmetic
(e.g., x ·yz + c > 0) and transcendental functions (namely, log). Non-linear theories are generally
undecidable. To work around this fact, we implement an incomplete formula validity checker
using an eager version of the theorem enumeration technique recently proposed by Srikanth et al.
(2017). First, we treat non-linear operations as uninterpreted functions, thus overapproximating
their semantics. Second, we strengthen formulas by instantiating theorems about those non-linear
operations. For instance, the following theorem relates division and multiplication: ∀x ,y.y > 0⇒
x ·y
y = x . We then instantiate x and y with terms over variables in the formula. Of course, there are
innitely many possible instantiations of x and y; we thus restrict instantiations to terms of size 1,
i.e., variables or constants.
Our implementation uses a xed set of theorems about multiplication, division, and log. ese
are instantiated for every given formula, typically resulting in ∼1000 additional conjuncts. To give
an intuition, we list some of those theorems below:
• ∀x ,y.y > 0⇒ x ·yy = x
• ∀x ,y, z. z > 0⇒ x ·yz + xz = x ·(y+1)z• ∀x ,y. x > 0 ∧ y > 0⇒ x · y > 0
• ∀x ,y. x > 0 ∧ y > 0⇒ xy > 0
In all of the dierentially private algorithms, we can prove correctness by treating log completely as
uninterpreted, requiring no log specic theorems, just the fact that, e.g., log(x) + log(x) = 2 log(x).
Interpolation Technique. Given the richness of the theories we use, we found that existing
proof-based interpolation techniques either do not support the theories (e.g., the MathSAT solver)
or fail to nd generalizable interpolants, e.g., cannot discover quantied interpolants (e.g., Z3). As
such, we implemented a template-guided interpolation technique (Albarghouthi and McMillan 2013;
Rummer and Subotic 2013), where we force interpolants to follow syntactic forms that appear in
the program. Specically, for every Boolean predicate φ appearing in the program, the specication,
or the axioms, we create a template φt , which is φ but with variables replaced by placeholders,
denoted  i . For instance, given x > y, we generate the template  1 >  2.
Since the failure probabilities, encoded in variables ωi increase additively by accumulating eub
expressions from the distribution axioms, we use the template
ωi 6
n∑
j=1
 j ∗ eubj ,
where eubj is the failure probability of the axiom used in the jth sampling statement, assuming there
are n such statements along the path, and  j can take terms of V det—following the restriction on
labels.
Given a set of templates, our interpolation technique searches for an interpolant as a conjunction
of instantiations of those templates, where each  i can be replaced by a well-typed term over
formula variables. Given the innite set of possible instantiations, our implementation xes the size
of possible instantiations (e.g., to size 1), and proceeds by nding the smallest possible interpolants
in terms of number of conjuncts. If it cannot, it expands the search to terms of larger sizes. We
ensure that the special variables ωi only appear in their set of inequality predicates dened above.
erefore, given an interpolant I , we can syntactically divide it into I = IV ∧ Iω , where IV is over
program variables V and Iω , ωi 6 . . . provides the upper bound on failure probabilities at that
point along the trace.
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D.1 Proof of Report Noisy Max (noisyMax)
We give an abridged form of the proof computed for Report Noisy Max in Fig. 15. e set of queries
Q is assumed to be non-empty, and for simplicity, we let b be initialized to 1 instead of⊥ and modify
the conditional to check if b = 1—resulting in an equivalent program. e boom automaton shows
a merge of the two paths through the conditional in the loop. Notice that the propagated error
probability is
p · (i − 1)
|Q |
is is because in each iteration, we apply the Laplace axiom with
f (V in) = p|Q |
Aer k loop iterations, i = k + 1, and therefore we have accumulated a failure probability of p ·(i−1)|Q | .
(If the program were rewrien so as i starts at 0 and the loop condition is i < |Q |, we would have
the simpler failure expression p ·i|Q | .) Finally, we can infer that the total failure probability is p. is
is due to the state label (blue) φ.
e label φ is dened as the conjunction of the following formulas, which we simplify for
presentation:
|Q | + 1 > i > 1
i > b > 1
i , 1⇒ b < i
∀j ∈ [1, i). |aj −Q j (d)| 6 2
ε
log |Q |
p
∀j ∈ [1, i). ab > aj
e rst two conjuncts specify the range of values i takes throughout the loop iterations. e
third conjunct species that i leaps ahead of b aer the rst loop iteration, since i is always
incremented at the end of the loop, and b can at most be i − 1 at that point. (e syntactic form of
an implication is derived from the conditional’s predicate.) e fourth conjunct species that, for
every element of j of a, its distance from the corresponding valuation of Q j (d) is bounded above by
2
ε log
|Q |
p , which follows from the choice of the axiom. Finally, the last conjunct states that the best
element is indeed larger than all previously seen ones.
e last two conjuncts are primarily responsible for implying the postcondition (via the triangle
inequality):
∀j ∈ [1, |Q |].Qb(d) > Q j (d) − 4
ε
log |Q |
p
Notice that the 2ε log
|Q |
p in the fourth conjunct translates to
4
ε log
|Q |
p in the postcondition. is is
due to the absolute value.
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in 0
ac
in ac
0 0 0
[i 6 |Q|] [i > |Q|]
i = 1 |Q| 6 0
j j
p· (i  1)
|Q|
p· (i  1)
|Q|
p· (i  1)
|Q|
p
jpost
[i 6 |Q|]
[i > |Q|]
i i+ 1
a[i] lap(. . .)
q  Qi(d)
e > 0
b,max, i 1,?, 1
a Z[|Q|]
b,max, i 1,?, 1
a Z[|Q|]
e > 0
Fig. 15. Main loop of verification algorithm
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